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DEMOCRACY AS MEANINGFUL
CONVERSATION
Robert W. Bennett*

I

Much discussion of democracy in the United States, popular
as well as scholarly, employs simple, descriptive models of that
democracy. The most commonly encountered of these is what I
call the "vote-centered" model of democracy. Under this votecentered model the public policy outcomes produced by legislatures are traceable to equally weighted voter inputs. Another
model that makes frequent appearance in the literature about
democracy is an "interest group" model, under which democratic outcomes are depicted as "equilibrium" states in struggles
among competing powerful, organized groups. For a variety of
reasons, I do not think that either of these models' does a very
satisfactory job of integrating the phenomena of American democracy. I will have something to say later about the interest
group model, but the deficiencies in the dominant vote-centered
model are particularly glaring and, because of its dominance,
particularly important. The vote-centered model will be my
principal foil in this Comment, as I advance another possibility,
what I call "democracy as meaningful conversation," under
which the citizenry is engaged by ongoing public conversation

• Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. This Comment
benefitted greatly from faculty discussions at Northwestern and at the European University Institute in Fiesole, Italy. In addition, I received especially helpful comments from
Bob Bums, Dan Polsby, Jim Lindgren, Beryl Radin, Dave Haddock, Jack Heinz, AI
Harris, Paula Wolff, and Matt Spitzer, and able research assistance from Scott England
and Maureen Gest of the Northwestern class of 1998 and from Mary Tait of the Northwestern class of 1999.
1. Democracy can be and has been modeled in a large variety of ways. See generally, David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford U. Press, 2d ed. 1996). I will mention a few other models in passing, but my purpose is not to exhaustively catalogue the
strengths and weaknesses of each extant model, but rather to criticize the dominant one
and open up the power and possibilities of a new one.
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about public policy, and it is this engagement that is the stabilizing force in the system.
The existing descriptive models are not typically referred to
as "models." They are not in any sense formal models. Indeed,
they are usually implicit in discussions of democracy, rather than
explicit. Even if implicit, however, they are models in the sense
that they encapsulate American democracy by reference to certain central features. And they are simple models by virtue of
the fact that the features they employ are few in number. As
these simple models are made explicit, certain difficulties in the
modeling process come into focus that are probably best highlighted from the outset.
Models can be descriptive or normative, or even both at
once. While the line between the two is in principle tolerably
clear, it is also difficult to heed. Descriptive models describe
what is, frequently ascribing causal connections among parts of
what is modeled, and even predicting results to be expected if
changes are made. 2 In contrast, normative models provide an
ideal to be strived for, or perhaps only dreamt of, but that need
not now exist, or even be attainable. Still, models advanced as
description are often likely at least to insinuate normative judgments. For all descriptive models are selective. They choose
some features of the system they purport to model to the exclusion of others. The simpler the model, the more selective it will
be. And if what a model identifies as encapsulating the modeled
system is seen as a desirable feature rather than an undesirable
or a normatively neutral one, then the model perforce has a
normative twist.
Holding the line between descriptive and normative models
is additionally complicated by the fact that models consciously
designed as normative are seldom greatly divorced from the reality they seek to instruct. If the distance is too great, the task of
bridging it will likely seem too substantial to justify the bother.
For this reason there will typically be a high degree of correspondence between normative models and the portion of the
real world in view, so that even normative models may easily be
mistaken for description- by the consumers of commentary
based on models, but also on occasion by the commentators.
2. It is possible to have a descriptive model that carries no predictive implications,
and also to have a model that predicts while not containing anything that might plausibly
be called "description." Most descriptive models do, however, have pretensions of predictive power, and the model I propose is of that sort.
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The difficulty of holding the line between description and
prescription is especially acute when modeling democracy/
probably because the appeal of democracy in the modern day is
at once so great and so badly in need of explanation. Whatever
the reasons, the descriptive and the normative are thoroughly
intermixed in existing uses of the vote-centered model. My
criticisms will largely be on a descriptive plane, but it may occasionally be that the criticisms unjustifiably mistake for description what was intended as prescription. And while the inspiration for the conversational model is description, the prescriptive
pull has proved irresistible for me as well. What democracy as
meaningful conversation purports above all to describe and explain is stability in the system, which it traces to widespread
conversational involvement of the citizenry. Stability is usually
viewed as a desirable feature of political systems, especially
when, as with the conversational model, it is not the product of
coercion. For that reason I will often ascribe virtue to conversational phenomena. But I want to be clear that any normativity
in the conversational model is decidedly limited. Stability is
surely not the only, or even necessarily the highest, virtue in systems of government, nor do I claim that the conversational
model identifies the only source of stability in democracies.
Even on a descriptive level, simple models of complex
things can easily mislead, for they will inevitably fail to account
for a good deal of the complexity. For large scale social phenomena like democracy in the United States, controlled experimentation is unavailable, so that ascribing causal connections
must always be done cautiously and tentatively. If two models
describe and explain different things, moreover, there will be no
common metric by which to judge one more "accurate" than the
other, and also no objectively verifiable basis for saying that the
one rather than the other has described the "right" thing. Despite these difficulties-or perhaps because of them-the more
complex a phenomenon of interest, the more inevitable and useful simple models will be. They break the complexity down into
a more useable form, one that can facilitate understanding and
discussion. In such a setting the appeal of a model will necessarily rest not on some systematic basis for choice, but on informed intuition about whether the model identifies important
things and provides a measure of coherence in its account of diverse phenomena. It is on this basis that I believe that democ3.

See Held, Models of Democracy at 8 (cited in note 1).
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racy as meaningful conversation succeeds. The description it
provides is by no means comprehensive, but the model does
point the way to connections among important features of
American democracy that the vote-centered model, its most
prominent competitor, misses or muddles.
I begin in Section II with some sounds of silence that got
me thinking about deficiencies in the vote-centered model and
about alternatives to it. I begin with the almost unquestioning
acceptance of the apportionment of the United States Senate.
II
The absence of controversy over the apportionment of the
Senate is striking. In the Great Compromise of 1787 that
opened the way for agreement on the Constitution, the House of
Representatives was apportioned among the states by population (with the significant qualification that each state is entitled
to at least one representative), while the Senate was apportioned by states, with each entitled to two Senators. This equal
Senate representation of the states is declared by the Constitu4
tion to be unalterable without a state's consent. The obvious
consequence is that populous states have less representation per
capita in the Senate than thinly populated ones (while citizens in
territories and the District of Columbia have none at all). In
1787 the disparity in population between the more and less
populous states was already significane -that is what necessitated the compromise-and it has grown over the years. Today
the ten most populous states have more than fifty percent of the
nation's population. California alone has more than sixty-five
times the population of Wyominr, while each has the constitutionally prescribed two Senators. Suggestions are occasionally
4. U.S. Const., Art. V.
5. In Federalist 22 Hamilton lamented the equal state suffrage in the unicameral
Congress under the Articles of Confederation. He noted that a "majority of States ...
[could comprise] a small minority of the people of America." Federalist 22 (Hamilton)
in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 143, 146 (Mentor, 1961). In a footnote he
calculated that at the time "New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware,
Georgia, South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of the
States, but they do not contain one third of the people." !d.
6. See Robert Famighetti, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1997, at
384 (World Almanac Books, 1996) (relying on the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Depart·
ment of Commerce, 1990 Census). According to the 1990 census, the ten least populous
states-providing 20 percent of the total number of Senators-contain just over 3 per·
cent of the nation's population. !d. For a discussion lamenting the situation on the basis
of data from the 1980 census, see Peter Suber, Population Changes and Constitutional
Amendments: Federalism Versus Democracy, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 409 (1987).
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advanced with apparent seriousness that California be split into
two states, but to the best of my knowledge the focus of concern
is exclusively intrastate, asserted antagonisms or incompatibilities of north and south, and not at all dissatisfaction with the
7
state's apportionment in the United States Senate.
This seems all the more remarkable given the reapportionment decisions of the United States Supreme Court, especially
the 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims. 8 In Reynolds the Court
decided that both houses of bicameral state legislatures were required to be apportioned by population. In doing so the Court
was naturally called upon to explain how it was that the national
legislature-most importantly the Senate-is not only allowed
but required to deviate from that pattern. There is, of course,
specific constitutional language governing the apportionment of
the Senate, while the Constitution is basically silent on the structure of state government, save that the states are guaranteed a
"Republican Form of Government" 9 -the framers' term for
what we would be more likely to call "representative democracy."10 The Court based its decision not on that "guarantee,"
which had long been held non-justiciable, 11 but on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And the
Court in Reynolds provided an explanation for the difference in
constitutional treatment of the Congress and state legislatures
that on its own terms seems persuasive enough:
The system of representation in the two Houses of the Federal Congress is one ingrained in our Constitution ... con-

7. See Katherine Bishop, California Dreaming, 1991 Version: North Secedes and
Forms 51st State, N.Y. Times, 7 (Nov. 30, 1991). Perhaps even more striking is the apparent disinterest in the possibility suggested by a provision attendant to the annexation
of Texas and its admission to the union as a state: "New States, of convenient size, not
exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient
population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory
thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution." Joint Resolution for Annexing Texas to the United States, 5 Stat. 797 (1845). (I
am indebted to Vic Rosenblum for this reference.) For a few lonely (law professor)
voices decrying senatorial representation based on states, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. !043,
1070-71 (1988); William N. Eskridge, The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 Const.
Comm. 159 (1995); Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, 12 Const. Comm. 213
(1995).
8. 377 u.s. 533 (1964).
9. U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 4.
10. See, e.g., Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers at 77 (cited in note
5).
11. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I (1849); see generally Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217-25 (1962).
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ceived out of compromise and concession indispensable to the
establishment of our federal republic.

***
Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities [on which
legislative districts were often based], or whatever-never
were and never have been considered as sovereign entities .... [T]hese governmental units are "created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers
of the State as may be entrusted to them," and the "number,
nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] ...
and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in
the absolute discretion of the State." The relationship of the
States to the Federal Government could hardly be less analot2
go us.

Persuasive as this distinction might be as a matter of law, it
does not explain the absence of controversy surrounding the
Senate. Indeed the Court's rationale for the basic holding of
Reynolds compounds the puzzle. According to the Court,
population-based apportionment of State legislatures- the
Court's famous shorthand formula was "one man one vote" -is
necessary to give each citizen an "equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature," as part of an
"inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. " 13 If "full and effective participation" requires population-based apportionment
in the state context, however, no reason appears from what the
Court had to say in Reynolds why the Senate apportionment
would not be defective as well, in which case one would expect
to see agitation about its apportionment, or at least some substantial sign of dissatisfaction, even supposing that the obstacles
14
to constitutional change are insuperable. Also striking is that
12. 377 U.S. at 574-75.
13. !d. at 565 (emphasis supplied).
14. An argument could be made that, despite the attempted entrenchment of the
equal Senate representation by Article V, representation could be changed without a
State's consent by first amending Article V to eliminate the entrenchment and then
amending the senatorial representation provision. See remarks of Senator Bigler,
(quoted in Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 Ariz. L.
Rev. 717, 729 n.67 (1981)). Whatever the theoretical or practical possibilities of such a
two-step process (about both of which I am dubious), change with the consent of overrepresented states is in any event not foreclosed. As a practical matter the obstacles to
splitting California into two states, which would yield doubled Senate representation for
the people of the old California, are surely as great, yet that has not prevented the idea
from gaining a degree of prominence. See text at note 7.
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the Court's requirement of population-based apportionment for
state legislatures has itself been relatively uncontroversial, even
while coexisting in apparent ease with a Senate apportionment it
seems-with its talk of "inalienable right"- to brand as in principle foreign to the central tenets of American democracy.
The more I puzzled about popular acceptance of a malapportioned Senate, the more it became clear to me that the notion the Court articulated in Reynolds of what is central to democracy in the United States is pretty far off base. Many
difficulties with what the Court had to say have been noted over
the years. Thus, as public choice theorists repeatedly tell us, in
itself the vote is a decidedly ineffective means by which an individual citizen participates in politics. Demographic and other
groupings of voters may tend to vote alike, and as groups they
may prove decisive in candidate elections. The Court's emphasis in Reynolds, however, was on the individual's right, and in
any reasonably populous district no individual voter has any significant chance at all of having his vote determine the outcome
of an election. 15 In that sense, the vote of each individual was already (more or less) equally (in)effective in virtually all state
electoral districts, essentially regardless of malapportionment.
If the Court was really striving to equalize the degrees of
(in)effectiveness of the individual's vote, moreover, it was on a
fool's errand. In the tallying of votes in each district each person's vote was already given the same weight. Each "person"
(that is, "voter") already had "one vote."
Beyond that,
"effectiveness" of the vote as an instrument of electoral decision
in the district or state {putting aside for the moment matters
other than the vote that might make an individual citizen's voice
"effective," or "participation" in legislative processes "full and
effective") would be dependent on the distribution of politically
salient sentiment. Holding size of the electorate constant, a vote
in a district that is politically homogenous stands a much smaller
chance of affecting the outcome in the district election than does
a vote in a district where contending forces are about evenly
balanced. 16 And insofar as "effectiveness" in the state legisla15. One commentator estimates that an individual"s chance of having his vote determine the outcome of an American presidential election is ''about [the] same order of
magnitude as ... [the chance] of being killed driving to the polls."' Paul E. Miehl, The
Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument, 71 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 11
(1977); see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 244-47, 267 (Harper &
Row, 1957); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 120-24 (Cambridge U. Press, 1979).
16. See Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 204-05 (Harvard U. Press, 1995).
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ture is associated with representation there of a voter's favored
political party, nothing that happens in a district election matters one whit unless the state legislature comes to be close to
equipoise in party representation. These matters the Court did
not purport to address, and if it had attempted to do so, perhaps
by requiring that each district reflect the political complexion of
the state as a whole, it would have risked sinking the federal
courts (and the country) in a quagmire of apportionment litigation. Being essentially powerless to produce either effectiveness
or equal effectiveness of the individual's vote in candidate elections, what the Court did was impose a formal equality of individual voting power in the state as a whole on top of the formal
equal distribution of voting power in a district election that alrea d y ex1ste d .17
0

III
As I got more deeply into these matters, increasingly it
seemed that the conceptual problems with the Court's rationale
in Reynolds run deep. The decision appears to be rooted in a
traditional model of representative democracy in the United
States that emphasizes the vote for representatives as its defining and dominating characteristic, as the essence of selfgovernment in ~mr "republican" form of government-a model I
call "vote-centered."
In this vote-centered model, there are two discrete stages
by which important choices of public policy are made, first election of representatives, and then public policy decisions by those
representatives in the form of legislation. The electorate has its
decisive say through the vote in the first stage. This vote in candidate elections is advanced as the mechanism within the model
of popular sovereignty and self-governance, and it is associated
with political equality through equal weighting of votes, and
with majoritarianism, often taken to be a corollary of political
equality. 18 Separately and together these elements are often ad17. In Section XI, I discuss an alternative rationale for the Court's decision in Rey·
no ids.
18. The connection is not a necessary one. Drawing straws with each person enti·
tied to the same number of draws, or having certain things dealt with administratively
without any vote at all, also treats each person "equally" (assuming in the latter case
that the administrator is sufficiently under control, that he can be assumed to a mere
functionary). So arguably does a supermajority requirement (say for constitutional
amendments) where each voter is treated identically in determining whether the supermajority requirement has been satisfied, or the common practice in the United States of
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vanced in a normative spmt.
Popular sovereignty, selfgovernance, political equality, and majoritarianism are taken to
be elements of what a political system should be. At the same
time, however, they are taken to constitute a basically accurate
description of contemporary American democracy.
Under this model, the electorate's active role is largely
completed in the first stage. Despite this, popular sovereignty,
self-governance, political equality, and majoritarianism are assumed to carry through descriptively to the second stage as well,
to characterize the entire system and the decisions it reaches. If
the people as a whole are "sovereign," and that sovereignty is
distributed equally, then the legislative decisions are theirs too,
and theirs equally, which means that each voter exercises an
equal portion of influence in the eventual decisions of democratic government, those taken by the representative assembly.
The mechanism by which this is accomplished under this
vote-centered model is that the interests of the electorate are
"re-presented" in the second stage by the representatives voted
into office in the first. In this view representative democracy is
adopted as an admittedly inferior substitute for bringing the entire people together to make the decisions of government, as the
only efficient way in a large scale democracy to provide sovereign decisions by the sovereign people. The accuracy of the representation of the interests of the electorate by representatives
is aided by open competition among candidates in the candidate
elections, so that the most faithful re-presenters are chosen.
Free speech and free press are important then, and also between
elections, to shore up the information base of the re-presenters
about the interests of the electorate. Still, the process between
elections is in the nature of things imperfect, because most people remain silent then. It is the vote where virtually all adult
citizens have the opportunity to speak, and it is the vote through
which the sovereign people rule. Under the vote-centered
model, the process is taken systematically to turn citizen preferences into "majoritarian" legislation. Votes are the crucial inputs in the vote-centered model, but much of the appeal of the
model is in its depiction of public policy outputs as referable
rather directly to equally weighted input of votes. Under the
model citizen respect-and the stability it engenders-is gar-

allowing plurality decisions to govern in candidate elections with more than two candidates. See text at notes 73-74.

490

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:481

nered because outputs are systematically related to inputs in this
way. 19
I do not claim that any single theorist of American democracy has explicitly embraced as descriptively accurate all the
elements of such a vote-centered model. 20 To the contrary, the
19. While Madison, the most influential of the constitutional framers, did not usually talk in vote-centered terms, see text at note 44, other Federalists at the time did.
Thus "Philanthrop'' to the Public wrote: "[A)re not the Congress and Senate servants of
the people, chosen and instructed by them, because the whole body of the people cannot
assemble at one place, to make and execute laws?" "Philanrhrop" to the Public in I The
Debate on the Constitution 325 (Bailyn ed. 1993); see Max Farrand (ed.), 1 The Records
of the Federal Convention of 1787 132 (Yale U. Press, 1986 revised ed.) ("The Govt.
ought to possess ... the mind or sense of the people at large."); Farrand, IV Records,
supra at 265 (''a representative body should serve as ... the most natural substitute for
an assembly of the whole") (quoting John Adams); "An American Citizen" II, in I Debate, supra at 25, 27 ("the house of representatives-a body so pure in its election, so intimately connected by its interests and feelings, with the people at large ....");
"Americanus" III, in I Debate, supra at 437, 440 ("By this simple expedient [of representation] can the sense of the people of an extensive Empire be collected with ease and
certainty"). Even Madison would on occasion use rhetoric with a vote-centered tinge
when engaged in political debate, as he so often was. See, e.g., Federalist 52 (Madison)
in The Federalist Papers 325 (cited in note 5); Federalist 54 (Madison) in The Federalist
Papers 336 (cited in note 5); Federalist 57 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 350 (cited
in note 5); Farrand, I Records 472 ("If the power is not immediately derived from the
people, in proportion to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will
be all"). In the ratification debates many antifederalist arguments can be seen as expressing doubt that vote-centeredness could be achieved in the "extended republic" of
the United States. See generally, Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalists, Representation, and Party, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 12 (1989) ("Anti-Federalists regarded representation as a second-best substitute for local self-government-a potentially dangerous
attenuation of personal responsibility and assent. Their vision of representation would
have required representatives to know and like their constituents, share in the community's deliberations, and appreciate local opinions and feelings.").
20. The constitutional framers besides Madison who are quoted in note 19 were
essentially predicting that at least the House of Representatives would function after the
fashion of the vote-centered model. With regard to moderns, the tendency to mingle the
descriptive and the prescriptive makes it difficult to point to purely descriptive votecentered commentators. Robert Dahl, for instance, perhaps America's preeminent
democratic theorist, seems pretty clearly to think that an ideal democracy would hark to
vote-centeredness. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 97 (democracy
associated with people governing themselves), 100 (democracy associated with equal
weighting of interests), 109 (democracy associated with equal weighting of votes "[a]t
the decisive stage of collective decisions"), 138 ("the strong principle of majority rule
ensures that the greatest possible number of citizens will live under laws they have chosen for themselves"), 144 (discussing a "utilitarian justification for majority rule"), 215
("representation ... as an application of the logic of equality to a large-scale political
system"), 322 (stressing importance of participation "in political life pretty much as
equals") (Yale U. Press, 1989). On a descriptive level, however, Dahl coined the term
"polyarchy" to describe a set of procedural characteristics focusing on electoral choice,
id. at 221, and he insists that "so far no country has transcended polyarchy to a 'higher'
stage of democracy." Jd. at 223. That would seem to exclude vote-centered outputs from
any descriptive account of modern democracies, but Dahl also occasionally discusses
contemporary electoral systems in terms of their realization of degrees of vote-centered
outputs. See, e.g., id. at 149 (discussing virtues of systems of "proportional representa-
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problems with it are many and to a great extent both apparent
and noted. 21 The vote-centered model is rather something that I
have fleshed out from what others say. But something like such
a model in both a normative and a descriptive mode seems to
have a substantial hold on those who theorize about, and those
22
who just seriously discuss, contemporary American democracy.
tion,"' see text at note 40, infra, as producing legislative majorities that replicate electoral majorities and thus do not "weaken the translation of majority preferences into law
and administration.") Dahl, supra at 149. Arend Lijphart sees Dahl's "polyarchies"
(presumably including the United States) as "democratic regimes ... characterized not
by perfect [vote-centered) responsiveness but by a high degree of it." Arend Lijphart,
Democracies 2 (Yale U. Press, 1984). Among other commentators, Joseph M. Bessette,
while insisting on the importance of deliberation in democracy, see text at notes 49-51,
betrays a fixation with vote-centeredness: "The electoral connection is the chief mechanism for ensuring ... a linkage between the values and goals of representatives and represented. If that linkage is sufficiently strong, then the policies fashioned by political
leaders will effectively be those that the people themselves would have chosen had they
possessed the same knowledge and experience as their representatives and devoted the
same amount of time considering the information and arguments presented in the national councils." Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason: Deliberative Democracy and American National Government 2 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994); see also Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy (U. of Chicago Press,
1996). Thomas Christiano is a contemporary commentator who comes close to advancing a vote-centered model as what a "legitimate" democracy must be. See Thomas
Christiano, Political Equality in Nomos XXXII at 151, Majorities and Minorities (John
W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer eds., New York U. Press, 1990). As sophisticated a
commentator as Ronald Dworkin recently characterized Reynolds in the following way:
'The Court ... struck down state schemes for drawing boundaries of electoral districts
whose effect was to deny equal electoral impact, citizen by citizen, on a one-person onevote basis." Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. Rev. of Books 44, 47
(Aug. 8, 1996) (emphasis supplied).
21. See Section IV.
22. Some prominent commentators take the vote-centered analysis a step further,
insisting that the point of democracies, including the United States variant, is to effectuate, or at least approximate, utilitarianism. See, e.g., Dahl, Critics at 143 (cited in note
20); John Hart Ely, Constitutional lnterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 Ind.
L.J. 399, 405-08 (1978); cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 276 (Harvard U.
Press, 1977 ):
Representative democracy [presumably absent court enforced constitutional
rights) is widely thought to be the institutional structure most suited, in a complex and diverse society, to the identification and achievement of utilitarian
policies. It works imperfectly at this, for the familiar reason that majoritarianism cannot sufficiently take account of the intensity, as distinct from the number, of particular preferences, and because techniques of political persuasion,
backed by money, may corrupt the accuracy with which votes represent the
preferences of those who have voted. Nevertheless democracy seems to enforce utilitarianism more satisfactorily, in spite of these imperfections, than any
alternative general political scheme would.
See also, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The
Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev.
295, 298-99 (I 979). The idea is traced to Jeremy Bentham in Jeremy Waldron, Rights
and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, in 20 Nomos XXXII at 44, 47-48 (cited in note 20).
I am among those who have found the utilitarian description beguiling. See Robert W.
Bennett, "Mere" Rationality In Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic
Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049, 1062-69 (1979). Among the many brave assumptions
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It is through use of such a vote-centered model, with its projection of the election stage ideology onto the system as a whole,
that I am able to make some sense of the Court's quest for "full
and effective participation" in "political processes of . . . [a]
State's legislative bodies," under a banner of "one person one
vote" in candidate elections. John Rawls also seems to be
working basically within a vote-centered model when he describes a "principle of (equal) participation" requiring that "all
citizens are to have an equal right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes
the laws with which they are to comply." 23 Rawls' theory, like
the Court's, has a normative thrust, but each must also think
that its normative vision is within shooting distance of the way in
which representative democracy actually operates. The spell of
the vote-centered model as description is probably most apparent in the repeated characterization of the American system of
government and the results it reaches as "majoritarian." 24 Legrequired for the effectuation of utilitarianism by representative democracy would be
that the legislature would somehow recreate in equal measures the desires not only of
electoral majorities in their districts, but of the entire electorate, and then trade among
them to achieve the maximum total satisfaction. While requiring additional assumptions
beyond simple majoritarian decision making, the suggestion that democracy serves utilitarian ends also seems rooted in the vote-centered model, for it too assumes that the
function of the representative assembly is to serve as a vehicle for transmitting voter
sentiments into legislation, and to do so with a form of equal treatment. See generally,
Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives 67,261 n.40 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994).
23. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 221 (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press,
1971 ); see Frederick Rosen, Majorities and Minorities: A Classical Utilitarian View in
Nomos XXXII at 24, 32 (cited in note 20). There is a measure of ambiguity when Rawls
uses the term ··right"' to denote what is held equally, rather than contribution to outcomes, but he does seem to have actual effect on outcomes in mind as at least one thing
that is to be distributed equally. He says, for instance, "[t]he liberties protected by the
principle of participation lose much of their value whenever those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public debate.
For eventually these inequalities will enable those better situated to exercise a larger
influence over the development of legislation." Id. at 225.
24. Both the Court and a broad spectrum of commentators describe the American
system in this way. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 139-41 (Free
Press, 1990); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 40 (Cambridge
U. Press, 1982); Robert C. Post, Constitutional Domains: Democracy, Community, Management 191 (Harvard U. Press, 1995); Eskridge, 12 Const. Comm. at 159 (cited in note
7); Michael J. Gerhardt and Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Constitutional Theory 3 (Michie,
1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in Sanford Levinson. ed., Responding to Imperfection 89 (Princeton U. Press, 1995); David R.
Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in Responding to Imperfection supra, at 117; Federalist 22 (Hamilton), The Federalist Papers (cited in note 5); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); cf. Douglas J. Amy, Real ChoicesWew
Voices: The Case for Proportional Representation in the United States 27 (Columbia U.
Press, 1993) ("The notion that legislatures should reflect as accurately as possible the
political desires of the public is central to most Americans' conception of democracy.").
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islative bodies generally take action by majority vote, of course,
but that cannot be what is meant when the American system is
characterized as "majoritarian," for so do other bodies like the
United States Supreme Court that are said bX some of the same
commentators to be "countermajoritarian." If the system is
said to be majoritarian that must mean that it produces some
(more or less) systematic translation of the interests or sentiments of societal ma!orities into legislation in the image of the
6
vote-centered model.
IV
The problems with the description of the American system
of government as "majoritarian" are legion. In the national
government of the United States-unlike a number of individual
states27 -not a single decision is entrusted to a majority vote of

The identification of majoritarianism and democratic (including in these cases, constitu·
tiona!) legitimacy is common to the otherwise very different projects of constitutional
theorizing by John Ely and Bruce Ackerman. Compare John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U. Press, 1980) with Bruce Ackerman, 1
We The People: Foundations (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 1991). See Schauer,
Deliberation About Deliberation, review of We The People, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1187, 1189
n.4 (1992). Both Ely and Ackerman think that present day American democracy is basically majoritarian, even if imperfectly so.
A few of the many references to the United States' system as "majoritarian" in
opinions of the United States Supreme Court are San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting); Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 598
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971)
(confusingly appearing to equate a societal and a legislative majority).
Many of these sources, of course, also often manifest recognition that the
"majoritarian" characterization is inaccurate to one degree or another. For explicit and
sustained attention to the limitations, see Komesar, at 67 (cited in note 22); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43,77-83 (1989).
25. The term was apparently coined by Alexander Bickel, see Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch at 16 (cited in note 24), and has now become standard fare, particularly in scholarly discussion of the Court's role. See Gerhardt and Rowe, Constitutional
Theory at 3-4 (cited in note 24); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 37-40
(Little Brown and Co., 3d ed. supp. 1996); William B. Lockhart, et al., Constitutional
Law 15-17 (West, 1996); Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 19-20 (Foundation Press,
12th ed. 1991); United States~·. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. This leaves ambiguous whether the relevant majority sentiment is for each
separate item on the public agenda, or for the entire package. The problems with the
characterization are largely independent of which meaning is intended. See note 35 and
accompanying text.
27. The states generally elect their governors and a varying number of other officials statewide and by majority vote. In addition, approximately half the states provide
for a limited degree of lawmaking through different forms of direct vote of the elector-
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28

the electorate. Nor is there any basis for finding an effective
majoritarianism in the ~rocess. Even apart from the apportionment of the Senate (and also putting aside the role of constitutional rights as "trumps" over legislative decisions, and of
the Supreme Court in elaborating and enforcing those rights),
any translation of majority sentiments of the electorate at the
candidate election stage into majority sentiments of the electorate at the stage of legislating is frustrated in a large variety of
ways.
To begin with, the vote for a candidate is a terribly blunt instrument for expressing sentiments on particular issues of governance. It is cast in the secrecy of a polling booth,31 so that
those elected do not know much for certain about the identity of
the large majority of their supporters or about the motivations
behind their votes. In virtually all elections for the national legislature in the United States, a candidate represents a bundle of
positions, and even if he only campaigns about one or a few he
will be called upon to vote on many. The vote for a candidate is
29

ate. See generally Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J.
1503, 1508-48 (1990).
28. Akhil Amar has recently suggested that a majority of American voters could
now require Congress to convene a constitutional convention by submitting a petition to
that effect "and that an amendment could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the
American electorate." Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, at 89
n.l (cited in note 24). See also Amar, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. (cited in note 7); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994). Those familiar with Professor Amar's other works will not
be surprised that he presents an argument in favor of all this with great skill. But there
is not a word in the Constitution that would support such a procedure. As suggested in
the text, moreover, such a procedure is thoroughly at odds with the most fundamental
assumptions of our constitutional order, including importantly the role of the states. For
instance, qualification to vote in federal elections was originally and remains to a degree
within the discretion of the states, see U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 2, cl. 1; Art. II,§ 1; Amend.
XVII, so that there are not even uniform national qualifications that would seem necessary to give coherence to the notion of a "simple" national majority.
29. I will not attempt to trace each of the majoritarian limiting points to the individual states, but apart from the population based apportionment of state legislatures,
limited statewide balloting on certain issues, and the popular election of many state
judges, the limitations on the "majoritarian" character of the national government basically apply in state contexts as well.
30. Before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, when Senators
were chosen by state legislatures, and those bodies in tum were often malapportioned in
population terms, it was not unheard of to have Senators who, by party affiliation at
least, were quite unrepresentative of the states they served. See George H. Ha:ynes, I
The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice 92 (Houghton Mifflin Company,
1938).
31. The secret or "Australian" ballot became common in the United States only
after the presidential election of 1884, which was characterized by "widespread charges
of voting frauds." Dahl, Critics at 234 (cited in note 20).
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thus opaque with regard to most of the actual decisions that
legislatures will make. 32 Indeed in most elections the vote is
probably cast as much with an eye on the past and the present as
on the future, when there are still decisions to be made. To be
sure, there is communication between voters and their representatives between elections, and the contemplation of a future is
always providing incentives for the here and now. But it is entirely unrealistic to think that the members of the legislative
body collect the sentiments of majorities in their districts as the
basis for decision on many, or perhaps even any, of the votes
they will cast. They do not have the ability to do so, but they
also do not have the motivation.
The principle reason for the absence of motivation is associated with what is called "the interest group theory of legislation."33 The basic insight of interest group theorists is that relatively small numbers of voters with large individual stakes in
some issue or set of issues will have the motivation to wade in
politically on those issues, while voters with smaller individual
stakes will not, even if they are more numerous. Interest group
theorists emphasize the political use of organized groups by
those with the larger stakes. We will return in Section XI to the
political role of organized interests. For present purposes, however, it is important to appreciate the force of the interest group
insight even when organized groups play no special role.
The private effects of essentially all public decisions are distributed differentially. This is so regardless of the root motivation behind the decision, be it self-interest or public-spiritedness
(assuming we can make coherent the distinction between the
two). Thus not only do tobacco growers benefit from tobacco
subsidies while most people do not, but military contractors
(among others) benefit more than the rest of us from expenditures for national defense, and manufacturers of air and water
purification devices (among others) benefit disproportionately
from efforts to clean up our common environment.
The differential distribution of effects is not limited to large
ones like those felt by defense contractors, nor to persons who
32. To say the least, "[e]lections are clumsy tools for setting policy." Garry Wills,
What Happened to the Revolution?, N.Y. Rev. of Books, June 6, 1996, at 11. (Vol. XLIII,
No. 10).
33. For an interesting discussion see Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 54-81
(cited in note 22); see also William N. Eskridge. Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Cases and
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 49·51 (West, 2d ed.
1995) ("Legislation").
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supply rather than consume goods and services. The most mundane of public programs-highway construction, police protection, provision of libraries (and taxation programs to pay for any
or all of these)-have differential effects on consumers as well
as suppliers, for some of us drive, read, or require police services
(and pay taxes) more than others. Nor need the effects be narrowly material, rather than ideological, as the ongoing American
dispute about abortion dramatically illustrates. Engagement on
that issue ranges from the extraordinarily passionate on both
sides to the ambivalent or indifferent.
This differential distribution of effects is then associated
with differential interest in the political realm. These differential political interests can be expressed through support of
groups that pursue the interests politically, but even if the interests do not justify that degree of involvement, they can be expressed through voting behavior. We are more likely to vote at
all when there is an issue at stake that matters especially to us,
and we are more likely to have our votes swayed by a candidate's stand on such an issue. 34 Since candidates for public office
understand all this, the politics of interests is everyman's politics
and not just that of organized groups. To the extent that candidates' positions are designed to attract votes and can be targeted
to do so, those positions will be geared not to majority sentiments on particular issues but, issue by issue, to sentiments of
those whose votes are in play. 35

34. For a discussion of why people vote at all, given the ineffectiveness of the indi·
vidual's vote as a determinant of policy, see text at notes 100-101. Whatever the explanation, it is unarguable that people do vote in large numbers, and, it seems to me, virtually as unarguable that an individual's vote is significantly responsive to candidates'
positions on particular issues.
35. Most of the rhetoric of "'majoritarianism" seems to assume that it applies issue
by issue. This is reflected, for instance, in the constant public opinion polling to determine what a "'majority of the American people" feel about this or that. But the
"'majoritarian" label seems no more likely to be an apt description of sentiment for the
complete package of public policies adopted in some constrained time frame. If candidates had even rough and ready information about voter sentiments on the entire range
of issues and the tradeoffs those voters would make among those positions (voter A, for
instance, would be willing to sacrifice a modestly more pro-choice position on abortion
for greater combat readiness of our armed forces), then the package of positions the
candidates espouse might conceivably be seen as reflecting estimates of electoral sentiment of their constituents summed over the entire public agenda. And if elected legislators then traded their votes in order to maximize the satisfactions captured in the programs that got them elected, the eventual public policy package might with a straight
face be depicted as a summed majoritarianism. But candidates and legislators have neither anything remotely approximating the information base about electoral sentiment
nor the incentive structure within the legislature that might justify such a characteriza-
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In other respects the discontinuity or slippage between
majority sentiments and outputs in the legislative stage was built
in at bedrock to the American system of government. Perhaps
36
most fundamentally (though not much discussed ), in the
United States members of legislatures are typically chosen in
geographically defined districts, with a single representative for
each district (two in the case of the United States Senate). This
raises the real possibility that the legislature may not mirror the
political complexion of the legislature's constituency as a whole.
Thus a country of sixty percent Libertarians and forty percent
Vegetarians divided into three "fairly" apportioned (i.e., by
population) single member districts for a unicameral legislature
could elect a Vegetarian majority if one of the districts contained only Libertarians and the other two districts split the re37
maining Libertarians evenly between them. And even if geographically based single member legislative districts do not
produce a legislative majority for a minority party, the geographical clumping of voters can easily yield less dramatic deviations in the legislature from the distribution of political senti38
ment in the electorate as a whole. In addition such districts
probably provide important incentives for a system of two major
political parties 39 which tends to clump the legislature as well, effectively excluding from representation in that body even quite
significant pockets of popular sentiment that might otherwise
have found expression in additional parties.
The possibility of large scale slippage between the candidate election stage and the legislating stage is not inevitable. In
a number of democracies, at least a part of the legislature is chosen from party lists or through other mechanisms that assure
that political parties are represented in the legislature in rough

tion-even before we get to the difficulties to which the text (supplemented by footnote
46) now turns.
36. In the legal literature at least. The subject is discussed by political scientists.
See, e.g., Jonathon Riley, American Democracy and Majority Rule, in Nomos XXXII at
267 (cited in note 20).
37. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 85-87 (1986) (O'Connor, 1., concurring).
38. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986).
39. This is often called "Duverger's Law." See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 217 (Barbara North & Robert
North trans., Wiley, 2d ed. rev. 1959). It is usually accepted as accurate, even if its
causal underpinnings are debatable. See Andrew Reeve and Alan Ware, Electoral Systems: A Comparative and Theoretical Introduction 9 (Routledge, 1992); William H.
Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lipjhart, eds., Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences 19, 41 (Agathon Press, 1986).
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proportion to their national support. A whole-hearted system of
"proportional representation" like this would be likely to be
characterized by multiple parties and to yield a legislature that
reflected, more or less, the genuine political complexity of the
jurisdiction as a whole. 40
In the debates surrounding the ratification of the United
States Constitution, there was little explicit attention paid to the
"distorting" effect of geographically based districts, perhaps because they were used in England 41 or, even more likely, because
the integrity of the states, themselves geographically defined,
was an unchallengeable assumption in the deliberations. But
given this setting, political "representativeness" of the legislature may not have seemed important, for it was not uniformly
assumed that the job of members of the legislature was to transform electoral sentiments into legislation as the vote-centered
model with its talk of "majoritarianism" assumes.
Recall that political parties did not become a fixture of
42
American politics until later and that neither the Senate nor
the President was to be directly elected under the original Constitution. Even with regard to the House of Representatives,
there was no shared assumption that it would simply recreate
what the electorate would have wanted had it been possible to
bring it together in one large voting assembly. Some made that
43
assumption, but according to James Madison, our chief constitutional architect, "the delegation of the government ... to a
small number of citizens elected by the rest" would serve to
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may
best discern the true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation
it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the
40. See generally Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An
Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes 7-10 (New York U. Press, 1994); see
Dahl, Critics at 110, 149 (cited in. note 20) (characterizing the electoral systems of the
United States, along with those in Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as
"highly defective" for not adopting proportional representation).
41. See generally, Reeve and Ware, Electoral System at 45-48 (cited in note 39);
Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 77, 161-62 (1985).
42. See James MacGregor Bums, The Vineyard of Liberty 134 (Alfred A. Knopf,
1982); see generally Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System (InstitUte
of Early American History and Culture, 1956).
43. See the comments of Philanthrop, Wilson, Adams, and American us III, cited in
note 19.
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representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
44
convened for the purpose.

In any event, other elements were consciously included in
the national government to assure that there was no simple
translation of electoral sentiment into legislation as the votecentered model assumes- a bicameral legislature with the two
houses of different sizes chosen in different ways from differ45
ently configured districts and for different terms, sharing power
with two other branches independent of it, and all superimposed
on, and dividing governmental powers with, a preexisting system
of various state governments. In such a setting the characterization of the United States system as "majoritarian" fundamentally misapprehends what is going on. Strongly committed, durable, and large supermajorities in the United States will almost
surely prevail through the political system (here including the
judicial system) over the medium to long run. Beyond that,
however, given the layers of "distorting" influences, 46 we are
44. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at 77-'8.2 (cited in note 5). Elsewhere Madison was more colorful-and harsh- in his characterizations of direct democracy. Thus in discussing the optimal size of the legislature in Federalist 55, Madison said
"(i]n all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails
to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob." Federalist 55, The Federalist Papers at
341, 342 (cited in note 5). A variety of additional models of democracy emphasizing the
independence of officials pretty clearly trace their lineage to the Madisonian vision. See
generally Eskridge and Frickey, Legislation at 123 (cited in note 33) (discussing
"agency" and "trustee" models of democratic representation, drawn from the conceptualization in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (U. of California
Press, 1967)).
45. The "districts" are identical when a state is entitled to only one representative,
or, as sometimes happens, elects at large one or more members of a multi-member
House delegation. The latter practice has long been disfavored by Congress. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S 124,158 n.39 (1971).
46. The "distorting influences" are nowhere near exhausted by those mentioned in
the text. Largely unnoted among the distortions is that children are not allowed to vote.
If one assumes that children are to be taken into account in the majoritarian calculus,
then this represents a large potential distortion. Even if we engage in the assumption
that parents are acceptable surrogates to represent the interests of their children, those
parents do not receive the extra votes that might be thought to do the trick. Among the
other distortions are that many of those eligible do not vote in candidate elections, and
that just who of those eligible does turn out to vote may be affected, among other things,
by the weather; that not all legislators may vote, with abstention caused, for instance, by
illness; that ballot position may swing candidate elections; that third party candidacies
may affect outcomes, especially given the plurality selection norm, see text at note 7374, infra, that when there are more than two choices, the problem of circular voting may
mean that there is no choice that can be said to be that of a majority; that nonmajoritarian cont.rol of the agenda (necessitated, inter alia, by the circular voting problem) can deterrnme outcomes; that the rhetoric in which issues are debated may be
h1ghly mfluent1al; and that dramatiC developments in the world (and the way they are
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surely kidding ourselves if we believe that any sustained and
even approximately systematic correlation-majoritarian or
otherwise-exists between electoral inputs into a policy-making
mix and legislative outcomes. 47

v
The ready acceptance of the Senate's apportionment helps
bring into focus a more fruitful way of thinking about
democracy in the United States-what I call "democracy as
meaningful conversation" -under which essentially the entire
electorate is engaged on an ongoing basis by meaningful public
conversation about public policy. The conversation in the
model is the totality of public conversation about public policy,
about what actions government should take and refrain from
taking. In this expansive sense, the democratic conversation
seems to be everywhere in the United States. It is obviously
seen on the electoral hustings, but it is also ongoing between
electoral campaigns, on radio and television, and in newspapers
and barber shops and the routines of stand-up comics. As far as
I can tell, to one degree or another it is also ubiquitous in other
genuine democracies, while nothing quite like it exists in nondemocratic countries.
I advance this conversational model as fundamentally descriptive and explanatory, rather than normative, as a tool to
help "us to understand what is going on by enabling us to organise our thoughts." 48 I believe that the conversational model
provides a coherent account of diverse phenomena of democreported in the press) closely preceding an election or legislative vote will often be in·
fluential. On top of all these, and in part no doubt because of at least some of them, citi·
zen preferences are not necessarily stable in a way that would provide integrity to the
process of translation of those preferences into policy outcomes at what will necessarily
be a later time.
47. Cf. Russell Hardin, Public Choice Versus Democracy, in Nomos XXXII at 185,
195 (cited in note 20) ("Even on the most favorable accounts of voter sophistication and
the quality of voter decisions, however, one cannot make strong claims that the outcome
of democratic voting procedures is a coherent mapping of citizen preferences onto policies"); Rosen in Nomos XXXII at 33 (cited in note 20) ("The phrase 'majority rule' or
the 'majoritarian principle,' once removed from the context of direct democracy, becomes misleading and even dangerous if it implies a measure of direct popular control
over government").
48. R. H. Coase, How Economists Should Choose in Essays on Economics and
Economists 15, 16-17 (U. of Chicago Press, 1994). In addition, "by unifying apparently
diverse phenomena ... [models] can change the way we look at the empirical
world .... " John Ferejohn and Debra Satz, Unification, Universalism, and Rational
Choice Theory, in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy 71, 72 (Yale
U. Press, 1996).
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racy in the United States-including its most fundamental elements and extending to more surface phenomena like the absence of controversy surrounding the apportionment of the Senate. One of the reasons democracies are useful things to
understand better is that they have proved enduring, and it is
the endurance, the stability of democracies, that is at the core of
what I seek to describe and explain. The conversational model
posits that the backbone of democracy, the source of much of
the popular respect it commands, and hence of much of its
strength and stability, is to be found not in popular sovereignty
expressed through voting, nor in some pattern of results at the
end of the legislative process, but in involvement of the electorate in the democratic conversation.
The model carries no pretense of complete depiction of
democracy in the United States, or even of explaining completely what makes that democracy stable. The model ignores
the level of economic well-being, as well as the distribution of
that well-being, each of which may well have an impact on the
stability of any democracy. It does not include any special role
for political parties, which are surely important "mediating institutions"49 that contribute to the effective functioning of the system as a whole, to its appeal and to its stability. It does not include the role of "rights" that define the boundary between
public power and individual prerogative, though any full description of American democracy would have to take account of
the role of rights. And, a related point, democracy as meaningful conversation does not include any searching integration of
the role of the Courts as constitutional policy makers.5(1 What
the model does posit is that the engagement of the electorate in
the democratic conversation is an important cause of the stability of democracies, or at least of the United States' variant on
the theme, a cause decidedly more important than the sense of
involvement in majoritarian "self-government" that comes from
periodic candidate elections.
If one believes, as I surely do, that, other things being equal,
stability in political systems is a good thing, then a model that
49. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1479, 1522-30 (1994); Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Instiltltional Transformation of Interests, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1443, 14fi0-65 (1994 ).
50. I will touch on the role of the courts, see notes 85-88 and accompanying text,
but the touch will be only a light one, for any full exploration of their role would take me
far afield from my present ambitions for examining democracy as meaningful conversation.
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explains stability will invite normative judgments. In this limited sense democracy as meaningful conversation has normative
purchase, as a byproduct of any descriptive and explanatory persuasiveness it may hold. Still I want to be clear that democracy
as meaningful conversation is not a normative model in any
fuller sense. The conversational model is perfectly consistent
with "democratic" reforms in the spirit of any number of different normative models of democracy, including the vote-centered
model that I described in Section III, if advanced in a normative
rather than a descriptive spirit.
A number of political philosophers and democratic theorists have noted a connection in one way or another between
democracy and popular involvement in conversation about public policy.' 1 Thus the importance of public "deliberation" is a
major theme of contemporary proponents of "civic republicanism. "52 The focus of these efforts is avowedly normative, the
charting of a way to make democracy better through pursuit of a
vision of the good and full citizen. Among these civic republicans some seem quite often to be charting that better future
with a vote-centered compass, suffusing their vision with an emphasis, something like that of the Supreme Court in Reynolds,
on equalizing the effective voices of all voters in a "deliberative
democracy."' 3 The inspiration for the conversational model is,
as I have said, quite different. It is to order and explain the way
51. See, e.g., John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action 24 (G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1935), in 2 The Later Works, quoted in Sandel, Dewey Rides Again, N.Y. Rev. of Books
35,36 (May 9, 1996); Post, Constitutional Domains at 185-87, 273-75 (cited in note 24);
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 284-88 (Russel and Russell, Anders
Wedberg trans. 1961), quoted in Post, Constitutional Domains at 185 (cited in note 24);
James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform
(Yale U. Press, 1991 ); MichaeiJ. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of
a Public Philosophy (Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 1996); F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 108-09 (U. of Chicago Press, 1960); Ackerman, We the People (ctted
in note 24); Richard H. Pildes and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
2121,2193 (1990); Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (cited in note 20); Page, Who Deliberates? (cited in note 20); see generally William Rehg, Translator's Introduction to
Jurgen Habennas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy ix (MIT Press, 1996).
52. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Go~·ernment, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 19 (1986); Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (cited in note 51); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993). See also, e.g., Thomas Christiano, Deliberative Equality and Democratic Order in Nomos XXXVIII at 251, Political
Order (Ian Shapiro & Russell Hardin eds., New York U. Press, 1993).
53. I discuss some of these matters in a review of Cass Sunstein's book, The Partial
Constitution, (cited in note 52). See Robert W. Bennett, Of Gnarled Pegs and Round
Holes: Sunstein 's Civic Republicanism and the American Constitution, 11 Const. Comm.
395,409-17 (1994).
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things are, rather than as they might be or should be. Its normative implications are incidental rather than central, in contrast to
the centrality of normative considerations to the civic republican
effort and others that have heretofore laid stress on deliberation.
VI
Democracy as meaningful conversation pivots on the incentive structure provided to elected officials by the prospect of
elections. Because I call the contrasting model "vote-centered,"
some might think that the electoral process must be peripheral
at best to the conversational model. To the contrary, while I
want to emphasize the role of the democratic conversation in
inducing fidelity to democracy, and de-emphasize voting as governance, the conversational model nonetheless posits that elections are important to democracy in two different ways. First,
the act of voting is itself part of the democratic conversation. As
conversation, voting is not very directed, but it occasionally can
bring the satisfaction of having sent a "message," however
muted, and however uncertain the sender must typically remain
that the message was received. Second, and more importantly,
elections shape incentives that provide the essential support for
the broader conversation. There does not seem to me to be any
plausible explanation for the democratic conversation, including
the time and energy devoted to persuasiveness in it, save that
periodic, genuinely contested elections, make the conversation
matter.
The incentive posited for candidates is the desire to be
elected and then reelected. This is the same incentive assumed
by public choice theorists, at least since Anthony Downs' classic
work, An Economic Theory of Democracy.;~ The real world
complex of motivations will, of course, vary from one candidate
or official to another, and typically be much richer than unadorned ambition to be elected or reelected.;; But models depend on such simplifying assumptions, and this one seems plausible enough. Starting with this motivation of officials, I think it
can be shown that meaningful public conversation about public

54. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) (cited in note 15).
55. See Daniel A. Farber and PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice 21-33 (U.
of Chicago Press, 1991 ).
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policy involving a very large proportion of the electorate is all
but certain to follow. 56
I want to be clear about what I am using "meaningful" to
mean. There are two interrelated components to the concept as
applied to the democratic conversation. First, an element of the
conversation is politically meaningful when what is said in it has
a real, even if only vanishingly small, chance to influence public
decision makers in public policy choices. There is no assumption under the model that any individual's views will end up
changing a result, nor of systematic transformation of electoral
sentiment into legislation. To have had a real chance to influence does not even mean that the element of the conversation
must have come to the attention of a decision maker, but rather
that it have genuinely entered into the process of give and take
that eventuates in a decision.
Second, the democratic conversation is personally meaningful to a member of the electorate when the political meaningfulness of one or more of its elements stimulates a sense for that
member of respectful engagement in the decision making process, a sense that the conversation included those politically
meaningful elements in part at least because that member's
opinions on those elements mattered. Political meaningfulness
feeds the sense of personal meaningfulness, and it is the latter
that is the stabilizing force within the model I propose.
This personal meaningfulness has broader ramifications, for
like all sustained conversational interactions, the individual's involvement in the democratic conversation becomes an integral
part of a set of relationships that the individual has with other
conversants and with the social and political system in which the
conversational activity is embedded. The conversation then becomes significant to the individual not solely, and perhaps not
even mostly, because of some possibility that it will persuade,
but because it is a part of that individual's sense of self. This in
turn brings the conversant back for more conversation-to persuade and be persuaded and just to converse.
There is no requirement of logical coherence for an element
of the conversation or of grounding in truth or in wellestablished factual premises. Much less need the conversation
be acceptable according to all or any theories of morality. The
conversational appeal to voters can be on whatever level en56.

See notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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gages them. History is replete with examples of "meaningful"
public conversation in this latitudinarian sense which is also demonstrably false or morally repugnant. Such moral repugnance,
or even more minor conversational sins, will often alienate some
voters as it engages others. The fact that the conversation is
public surely has the salutary effect of dampening some appeals
to pure self-interest and to baser emotions that might otherwise
be politically tempting. 57 The fact that it is politically meaningful
provides incentives for those who think they spot error to wade
in with rebuttal of the false or scurrilous. And the net effect of
the social heterogeneity of the United States probably serves to
contain the mischief that appeal to baser instincts might produce. This last was an article of faith for James Madison, and we
will explore it and related points below. 58 In any event, while
there surely is an enormous volume of well-reasoned argumentation on a vast array of subjects in the totality of the democratic
conversation, there is nothing in the concept of meaningfulness
as I am using the term that excludes error, repugnance, or the
disengagement of some voters that these can bring.
Unlike the vote-centered model, democracy as meaningful
conversation attempts no explanation of substantive outcomes
in terms of electoral inputs. Obviously many people are passionately concerned with substantive outcomes, some quite often, and more on certain occasions. For many the prospect of
influencing outcomes, or at least enjoying them, surely intensifies the sense of involvement in the democratic process, including in the democratic conversation. And thanks to the extensiveness of the public agenda, the great majority of people see
their favore~ positions on public questions emerge triumphant
on occasion.'9 But one of the interesting things about democracy
is that substantively disappointed voters are so readily reconciled to their losses. In genuine democracies, where elections
are truly competitive, votes on many public issues are likely to
be close, yielding large numbers of voters who are more than
occasionally disappointed with outcomes. The easy reconciliation of the disappointed is thus important to democratic stability. Some posited relationship of voter inputs to policy outputs
over the larger public policy agenda is altogether too abstract
57. "[The] dialogic enterprise always has built-in moral features or commitments
that constrain the conversation." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the
Understanding of Public Law, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123, 129 (1989).
58. See Section XI.
59. See text at notes 63-66.
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and too tenuous to look to it for explanation of the reconciliation.60
The reasons for the loyalty of electoral losers are surely
complex, and much of the explanation is just as surely to be
found outside the confines of the conversational model. The
lion's share of what matters to most of us proceeds through private channels, not public ones. If we find abundant private fulfillment, we may more easily adjust even to persistent disappointment in public affairs. Precisely for this reason, a large
field of private opportunity in a polity-of both the economic
and more personal sorts-may help account for the stability of
many democracies. In addition, particularly in large and heterogeneous democracies like the United States, electoral losers
one day may look forward to whatever joy victory, and its
promise of different substantive outcomes, might bring another
day. For local issues at least, electoral losers might even contemplate moving to a more congenial location. Or they may
identify with winners in other districts and the part those winners can play in the eventual decisions that are made. In part,
outcomes are not so purely a function of electoral winners and
losers. They are often compromises, again induced partly by the
fact that no sooner is one election over than another one is in
contemplation in which the votes of yesterday's losers will count
again. And not all electoral losers-or non-participants-are
easily reconciled. But democracy as meaningful conversation
posits that a centrally important part of what commands the loyalty of losing electoral minorities most of the time is that they
are nonetheless engaged by meaningful democratic conversation, and it is that fact that matters more than some felt equality
in voting privileges, patterned outcomes of the process, or even
the prospect that the future will provide victory to make up for
the defeats of the past. 61
It might be thought that no conversational involvement by a
member of the electorate could be any more politically
"meaningful" than that person's vote, which, as we have seen, is
close to zero. This is both wrong and beside the point. It is
wrong because there is a very large conversational agenda, with
no individual interested in anything approaching all of it. Just as
with the vote, the average member of the electorate is unlikely
to be decisive on any given item of that agenda. Still, as a simple
60.
61.

See Section IV.
Cf. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Yale U. Press, 1990).
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mathematical matter, a typical democratic citizen will be likely
to find conversational topics where he can have an appreciably
greater influence on outcomes than he would with a vote in a
candidate election. Of much more significance, however, the
conversation is ongoing, multifaceted and nuanced. A member
of the electorate can to a great degree adjust his conversational
involvement to his schedule, his level of interest in a particular
topic, his taste in commentators, and his personal interest in active involvement. The vote in candidate elections is in contrast a
62
rather sterile form of political involvement. For these reasons
the conversation has the capacity to involve a member of the
electorate in the ongoing process of government and thence into
a web of relationships in a way that the vote standing alone does
not. If members of a democratic electorate do have a real sense
that they are engaged in something appropriately called "selfgovernment," that sense is more likely produced by the democratic conversation than it is by the opportunity periodically to
cast a vote in candidate elections.
There is no way conclusively to prove the political meaningfulness of any part of the democratic conversation, and hence no
way to be sure that any sense that it generates of personal
meaningfulness is not grounded in self-delusion. There are stories, of course, about the power of ideas, and anecdotes to be
told about the marginal views of one generation becoming the
accepted wisdom of the next. We need look no further for examples than the history of women's role in contemporary
American society, or of public policy toward smoking. In the final analysis, however, with controlled experimentation unavailable, the political meaningfulness of the bulk of the democratic
conversation can only be surmised. For myself, the principle basis for believing that the great bulk of the democratic conversation is politically meaningful is the enormous time and energy
devoted to it, including by a large number of sophisticated participants. If self-delusion there be, it is both widespread and terribly stubborn.
62. I do not doubt that elections ''remain an important part of the nation's legiti·
mizing myth" and serve to a degree "to create and maintain a sense of national solidarity and community." Kim Ezra Shienbaum, Beyond the Electoral Connection: A Reassessment of the Role of Voting in Contemporary American Politics 123, 125 (U. of
Pennsylvania Press, 1984). The fact that many non-democratic countries adopt the form
of elections suggests that they see such symbolic power in elections, but as such countries regularly learn the form without the substance is eventually seen to be empty, even
as symbol. The "substance," I am suggesting, is to be found, at least in the United
States, in meaningful conversation about public policy.
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VII
The democratic conversation is not exclusively, nor even
mostly, a simple two-way exchange between representatives and
their constituents. Nor is it confined to the time frame of election campaigns, where the vacuousness and frequent insincerity
of much of what is said may well produce as much alienation as
engagement. The personal meaningfulness of the conversation
is no doubt in general heightened for a voter when he has a
sense of direct communication flowing to or from a candidate or
elected official This might be called "primary" democratic conversation. But participation by candidates or officials is not required. In any count of verbiage, the volume of "secondary"
conversation would surely dwarf that which takes place more directly between candidates or representatives and their constituents. This secondary conversation involves non-elected officials,
and professional and amateur commentators employed or given
exposure by innumerable media of communication. Secondary
conversation includes much give and take among ordinary voters, or even non-citizens, expressing their views on public issues
in all manner of public forums. The conversational model posits
that even the secondary conversation is to a very great extent an
outgrowth of the candidate election process and the relationships and incentives that it defines.
An important distinction should also be drawn between active and passive involvement in the conversation. In both primary and secondary conversation there are numerous active
participants. But most direct involvement in the conversation is
passive. Members of the electorate are much more often consumers of what is being said than active participants. Given the
number of members of the electorate and the possibility of multiple listeners for each speaker that is a feature of communication by mass media, it is to be expected that much more time
will be spent listening than speaking. For most elements of the
democratic conversation most members of the electorate will
likely not even be listening. Any individual member of the electorate will be out of the range of most of the conversation, for
in addition to lots of disinterest, there is simply too much of the
conversation. But universal, or even widespread, attention to
any particular part is not required for conversational engagement, for the conversation is so varied and so ubiquitous that
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the vast majority of members of the electorate will find some63
thing engaging in it.
To see why this should be so, it is instructive to take a closer
look at the incentive structure of active participants in the conversation, starting with the elected official or candidate for
elected office. 64 Given the incentive posited to be elected or
reelected, the candidate seeks to find a way to command a plurality of those voting at _the next election. Votes are interchangeable in the count, 6' and, to some extent at least undependable, in the sense that candidates never know for sure who
may vote for them. Indeed, thanks to the secrecy of the ballot,
candidates have no terribly reliable way even to find out who
has done so after the fact. As a first cut, candidates thus have an
incentive to communicate with each and every member of the
electorate, since each one represents a potential vote in an uncertain count.
It will often be efficient for a candidate to communicate a
single message to a broad segment of the electorate, since mass
media may make it little more expensive to reach a broad audience than a limited one. But there is also the possibility of targeting messages to discrete audiences, and an extended public
agenda is a great aid in attempting to do so. The electorate is
varied, and its members vote not en masse but one at a time.
This opens up the possibility that some voters can be addressed
on certain issues and others on different ones, to the basic satisfaction of each. Indeed because of the differential interest in issues, a candidate's combined stance on two issues can on balance satisfy each of two groups of voters even though each of
the groups disagrees with the candidate on one of the issues.
With an extensive public agenda, it then becomes possible for
candidates to reach and appeal to a large part of a segmented
electorate.

63. Benjamin Page seems to me to miss this point when he moves from the observation that active participation in deliberation cannot be available to the entire electorate to the conclusion that we therefore ''delegate deliberation." See Page, Who Deliberates? at 4 (cited in note 20).
64. To avoid constant repetition, I will refer only to the "candidate" in the discussion of these incentives. I choose that word to make clear that non-incumbents running
for office play a very important role as participants, and as stimuli for the conversation.
I want to be clear, however, that much of the conversational behavior under discussion
occurs outside the time frame of an election campaign.
65. The sole important exception to this in the United States is in presidential elections, where by virtue of the electoral college apportionment by states, a vote in one
state is not the equivalent of a vote in another.
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This incentive to reach out to all voters is qualified in at
least three ways. First, some districts will be reasonably safe for
the incumbent or the nominee of one party or another, in which
case there will not be much incentive for that candidate to reach
out to groups of voters perceived as unnecessary for election.
Nor will there be incentive to address voters whose views are so
highly idiosyncratic across the range of politically salient matters
that resources will be better spent sowing in more fertile electoral fields. And most importantly, the various interests among
the electorate may conflict with one another, so that what
pleases one will simultaneously displease another to the point of
alienation and opposition. This produces an incentive to mute
or entirely avoid contentious elements of the conversation66 and
when avoidance won't suffice, to disavow positions that might
drive into opposition more voters than it would attract.
The power of each of these qualifications is in turn limited
by a variety of considerations. Of crucial importance is the possibility of electoral challenge in both party primaries (where
they are held) and general elections. Voters neglected or alienated by one candidate will be especially appealing targets for
engagement by a challenger. In addition, even a dominant candidate is faced with one degree or another of uncertainty on a
number of fronts. He is uncertain about just who his supporters
are, about why they have been supporters, about what may recently have come to matter more to even known supporters, or
less, about the identity and thrust of electoral challenges that
may be in the offing. Some information will be available on
some of these matters, but uncertainty will remain, and that uncertainty will counsel even a dominant candidate to err on the
side of extending rather than limiting attempts broadly to engage the electorate. Uncertainty also creates an incentive in a
dominant candidate to gather information-to listen as well as
speak-and not just to state positions that may appeal but to
convince, to provide argumentation about what items should be
on the public agenda and about what should be done about
them.
No single candidate, moreover, nor even a set of competitors, can control the shape the conversation will take. Third parties-media, commentators, and more casual kibbitzers-play
an important role in defining the nature and reach of the conversation, and they have all manner of incentives that do not
66.

See Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy at 135-37 (cited in note 15}.
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necessarily map onto those of any candidate. Specialized media
have incentives to target audiences and expose them to public
policy issues of importance to them, even when candidates do
not. Mass media have incentives to maximize their audiences.
They will often do so by reaching out to a large variety of audiences, adopting the stance of reporters of developments rather
than advocates. What is embarrassing to candidates is at least as
fit for their purposes as what is pleasing. And commentators
will comment about anything that moves them, limited to be
sure by their capacity to find media to give exposure to their
views. These various third parties will exert constant pressure
on candidates to be drawn into conversation they might otherwise have neglected.
Also important in extending the democratic conversation is
the variety of offices open to popular election. These vary
greatly along lines of public policy coverage. And they vary in
geographical coverage, in the United States from the President,
through Senate and House districts, on down to representatives
to local school boards. The large variety of elected officials in
the United States may on occasion be conversationally counterproductive if it strains the voters' conversational stamina. 67 But
it does enrich the conversational possibilities in at least three
ways. It adds a further measure of competitiveness into the
conversational incentive structure. Even a candidate for local
dog catcher can challenge the President of the United States on
some issue or other. It slices issues and constituencies up in a
variety of ways that can then appeal to different grouping of
voters and in different ways. And it provides multiple focal
points for the especially intense conversational involvement that
comes from the direct participation of the candidate or official.
The net result of these incentives is what we observe, a sprawling, unwieldy-and politically meaningful-public conversation
about public policy, characterized by diversity and flexibility in
its capacity to engage the citizenry.
VIII
Under democracy as meaningful conversation the apportionment of the United States Senate is basically unproblematic,
so that its failure to generate controversy presents no puzzle.
The "weight" of a person's vote is essentially irrelevant, since in
67.

See text at note 80.
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virtually all elections in a polity of any significant size, no person's vote weighs enough to matter. Under the model, it is not
the vote cast for an official, but the conversation instigated by
the prospect of elections that matters to members of the citizenry, and in that respect the Senate and the House of Representatives are basically equivalent. 68
The choice of geographically based candidate elections over
a system of proportional representation may, however, be of
great importance. Systems of proportional representation seem
ready made for a vote-centered model of democracy, since, allowing for the admittedly substantial simplification that allegiance to parties requires, they transmit sentiment in the electorate intact into the legislature. 69 In contrast, geographically
based candidate elections, as we have seen, open up the real
possibility of disparity between electoral sentiment-even as
gauged by party allegiance-and the makeup of the legislature.
They also raise difficult questions under the vote-centered
model of whether a representative represents all the constituents of the district, or just those who voted for him. By the light
of democracy as meaningful conversation, however, geographically based candidate elections serve a very real purpose. They
define a special relationship between those elected (and those
seeking to be elected), on the one hand, and their constituencies
on the other, directing the focused concern of each to the conversational involvement of the other. Freed from the vote as the
focal point for popular involvement in governance, this relationship is ongoing, and it can then transcend partisan electoral politics. Thus we typically find that representatives in the United
States speak of "my" constituents and members of the electorate of "my" Senator and "my" Representative, regardless of
what may have taken place in the secrecy of the election booth.
There may, however, be subtle differences in methods of
districting that can affect the personal meaningfulness of the
democratic conversation for members of the electorate. Personal meaningfulness will likely be fostered if voters find it easier to keep track of who is representing them, at whom their par68. Even the complete absence of representation in the Senate for the electorate in
the District of Columbia and American territories leaves occasion for a measure of
democratic conversation (albeit an impoverished measure, see text at note 676), on account of other offices that remain subject to popular election.
69. See Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering at 58 (cited in note 40)
(the "undisputed merit ... [of systems of proportional representation] is fairness in representation ").
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ticipation in the conversation is ultimately aimed. Because
0
House districts are usually less populous than states/ House
elections more frequent than those for the Senate, and because
most individuals have two Senators but only one Representative, the voters might be thought to find it easier to keep up with
the identity of their representative in the House, rather than
that of their Senators. That must have been the original constitutional assumption, when Senators were to be chosen not in
popular elections but by the state legislatures. But apportionment of the Senate by states means that district lines for the
Senate are stable, 71 while district lines in the House of Representatives shift as population shifts. 72 Combined with the fact that
senatorial tenure is more sure, if only by virtue of the longer
term of office, the stability of senatorial "districts" may actually
lead to easier identification of and with Senators than Representatives, and hence to more personally meaningful conversation.
Democracy as meaningful conversation may thus suggest that
despite its malapportionment, the Senate is the more
"democratic" of the two houses of Congress.
In democratic elections in some countries, particularly for
the chief executive where that official is elected, there is an insistence that the eventual winner be chosen by a numerical majority of those voting, so that a runoff is employed if there are
more than two candidates and none obtains a majority in the
first round. 73 Since the ideology of American democracy associ70. Or, more precisely, never more populous. See note 45.
71. The Constitution provides that "no new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or
more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress." U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 3, cl. 1.
72. This is due in part to the Supreme Court's decision in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964), applying the one person one vote rule to intrastate House districting.
Subject to that constraint, the "shifting" of district lines can be done by state legislatures
even when population has not shifted, but in practice the one usually follows the other.
73. France provides the prime examples of such "two ballot" elections. The
French president is chosen in the manner described in the text, while members of the
French legislature, though chosen with "two ballots" if no candidate receives a majority
in the first round, may still emerge with only a plurality, because more than two candidates may make it into the second and final round. See Sartori, Comparath·e Constitutional Engineering at 11-12 (cited in note 40). A variation on the two ballot theme (not
including the majoritarian aspect) is found in election of the American President and
Vice-President, with the second round conducted under special rules in the House of
Representatives (or in the Senate, in the case of the Vice-President), if no candidate
wins a majority of the electoral college in the "first round." U.S. Const., Amend. XII.
Recourse to the House for election of the President has been required twice in American history, in the elections of 1800 and 1824. See Drinan, House of Representatives,
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 252 (Supp. I, 1986). (In subsequent textual
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ated with the vote-centered model attaches so much significance
to majority rule in candidate elections, one might have expected
to find such runoff elections the norm in the United States. In
fact, except for the contorted procedures for presidential and
vice-presidential selection, even the possibility of runoff elections is unusual at any level of American government. Instead a
plurality usually suffices for election to public office, and this is
perfectly satisfactory under democracy as meaningful conversation.74 Little is to be gained by additional election rounds, as a
single round can serve perfectly well as stimulus to the ongoing
democratic conversation.
American history has seen the gradual extension of the
electoral franchise, until it is now close to universally available
in the adult population. The appeal of broad extension of the
franchise is obvious under either the vote-centered or the conversational models. In conversational terms, personal meaningfulness of the conversation is the stabilizing force, and that
meaningfulness is ultimately dependent upon the incentives of
candidates to garner votes. The more broadly those incentives
extend, the greater the stabilizing influence the conversation
brings.
That children are not accorded the vote is understandable
in either vote-centered or conversational terms, because as a
group they likely have insufficient maturity for either selfgovernance or political conversation. But the conversational
model also explains why their parents or guardians need not be
accorded extra votes on account of their children, an omission
that presents a real puzzle for the vote-centered model. 75 As a
stimulus to conversational involvement, the single vote accorded
adults is entirely satisfactory.
There has also been a gradual movement in the United
States toward direct election of the most important public officials. In many democracies, some centrally important policy
making officials are elected by bodies which are themselves
elected. This is the way in which the chief executive- typically
called a premier or prime minister-is chosen in most democracies. In the United States, Senators were originally chosen by

discussion of the electoral college, I will omit mention of the procedure for selecting the
Vice-President.)
74. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986).
75. See note 45.
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state legislatures, ~ and the President was chosen by an electoral
college, the members of which were chosen as each state de77
cided, and hence did not even have to be popularly elected. In
the case of the Senate, the states gradually introduced popular
election on their own, and the Seventeenth Amendment now
78
requires that Senators be chosen directly by the electorate. In
the case of the President, the original electoral college scheme is
still basically in place as a formal matter, but the states (working
in conjunction with political parties) have all (more or less) effectively constrained their electoral college members to follow a
79
popular presidential vote in the state. By making more clearto these public officials and to their constituencies-with whom
the constituents are ultimately conversing, these changes likely
foster more personally meaningful conversation.
At the same time, there are surely limits to the conversational stamina of voters. Federal elected offices are few, but in
some states the ballot contains a laundry list of candidates for a
large number of state and local offices. In my home state of Illinois (by no means extreme in this regard), in addition to the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor, statewide elections are
held for a Secretary of State, an Attorney General, a Comptroller, and a Treasurer,w in addition, of course, to members of the
(bicameral) state legislature and a varying but often large number of local officials, including judges. Such a proliferation of
elected offices does have the virtue in conversational terms of
multiplying the possibilities for intensive engagement that
comes from personal involvement of the candidate. But the duties of many of these officials are decidedly peripheral to the
concerns of very large numbers of voters, with the result that
they are urged into conversations that hold little interest for
them. This seems at least as likely to alienate as engage. In
conversational terms it seems that the biggest conversational
bang for the general election buck is obtained by election of a

76.
77.

U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. I.
U.S. Const., Art. II,§ I, cl. 2.
See Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 452, 467

78.
(1955).
79. See generally William C. Kimberling, The Electoral College in I Essays in
Elections I (National Clearinghouse on Election Administration, 1992); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 Const. Comm. 201, 203-06 (1996). Most states
award their entire electoral college delegations to the state's winner of a presidential
popular vote, but Maine and Nebraska employ more complicated systems. See Kimberling, supra, at 8. See also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
80. See Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.§§ 5/2A-5-6 (Michie, 1996).

516

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 14:481

relatively small number of generalist public officials like legislators and chief executives.
The conversational model comfortably accommodates- the
sweeping protections afforded to speech and the press by the
First Amendment, and particularly the emphases on '"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"' and on assuring "'unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringin~ about of political and social changes desired by the people."' 1 This is not a particularly telling basis on
which to favor the model over its vote-centered competitor,
since the vote-centered model also accommodates open political
82
communication. Still, free speech and press are "mere" means
to the end of faithful decisionmaking under the vote-centered
model, while the conversational model places them pretty close
to the core of American democracy. In this sense, the conversational model may be more hospitable to the central role that the
First Amendment protections of communication have come to
play in contemporary constitutional law. In any event, neither
model would seem to provide a compelling explanation of the
substantial First Amendment protection that is in fact accorded
in the United States to non-political communication. 83
More telling, perhaps, is that the conversational model is
hospitable to the allocation of significant areas of public policy
to officials who are neither elected nor directly answerable to
those who are. This is a common and important feature of
American (and other) democracies that seems anomalous from
a vote-centered perspective, since it strains the connection between the members of the electorate and their re-presenters. In
the United States, such allocation is found by degrees, reaching
significant proportions with delegations to "independent" administrative agencies, subject in practice to varying regimens of
congressional and executive oversight or overruling. With the
Federal Reserve Board in the United States, for example, there
remains the possibility of control by elected officials, but that
possibility is hemmed in by very substantial legal and conventional restraints. 84 Policy-making by non-elected officials takes
its most extreme form with the constitutional power of the fed-

81.
82.
83.
84.
omy, 96

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam).
See note 19 and accompanying text.
See Stone et al., Constitutional Law at 1249-1322 (cited in note 25).
See A Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency AutonYale L.J. 787,810 n.146 (1987).
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eral courts effectively to veto state and federal legislation upon a
finding that it is unconstitutional.
While the sounds of silence about such constitutional review cannot compare with those about the Senate's apportionment, public opinion polls suggest that policy-making by C<?urts
8
is not particularly unsettling to the American body politic. ' At
the same time, however, constitutional decisions with regard to
particular matters can become quite controversial. These are
typically matters like abortion, racial preferences, and rights of
the terminally ill as to which strong and contradictory opinions
are widespread in the electorate.
The vote-centered model has little to offer in making sense
of this complex of attitudes toward judicial review. Its account
of the controversy that greets some court decisions relies on a
"countermajoritarianism" of the courts that assumes a
"majoritarianism" in the rest of the system that does not exist.&;
And the model offers no explanation of the general receptivity
to judicial review, which should be troublesome if vote-centered
"self-government" is at stake.
Judicial review by the light of the conversational model is a
large subject that I cannot do justice to here, but it is at least
clear that the conversational model provides a good deal more
suitable framework than the vote-centered model for accommodating the constitutional role of the courts, as well as other assignments of policy-making to unelected officials. Unlike the
vote-centered model, democracy as meaningful conversation
contains no suggestion that every member of the electorate need
be involved with each item on the public agenda. What matters
instead is that to one degree or another a sense of real involvement with public matters be widely dispersed among the electorate. Assignment of authority over areas of public policy to
non-elected officials-even relatively irretrievable assignment as
in the case of judicial review in the name of the Constitutiondoes not necessarily interfere with such widely dispersed popular involvement.
Nor is there anything particularly anomalous under the
conversational model about the political controversy that occasionally greets particular court decisions. The conversational
model need not posit that topics of conversation are entirely
85. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1995 71, 73 (Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1995).
86. See Section IV, supra.
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fungible for voters, that if they cannot be involved in conversation about abortion, the placement of a new schoolhouse will do
instead. People do care deeply about particular public issues,
and for those who care deeply a substitution of topics will not
do. And while the courts are not entirely unconversational,
theirs is not conventional conversation. They hear from litigants, of course; and unlike legislatures, appellate courts feel an
obligation to explain in detail and in writing the bases for their
decisions. The "democratic" problem with the courts under the
conversational model is that they insulate themselves from conversation with the broad range of people who may have a
pressing interest in certain issues before them. 87
The insulation is not solely the product of appointment
rather than election of the judiciary. As every first year law student learns, the courts necessarily perform two different functions-adjudication of past disputes and policy formation (i.e.
announcement of rules of law) for the future-that are in substantial tension with one another. While democratic conversation might be appropriate for the latter, it is decidedly ill-suited
to the former. As a result, ongoing democratic conversation by
judges is disapproved by professional norms of judicial conduct.RB For this reason it should not be surprising to find that
constitutional judicial decisions on controversial issues breed a
degree of resentment as "undemocratic" even in jurisdictions
where judges are elected.
IX
Democracy as meaningful conversation can also shed light
on less foundational features of American democracy. It suggests, for instance, that, other things being equal, stability of
89
electoral district lines is a good thing. The conversational perspective simultaneously raises a cautionary flag about the cur90
rently popular proposals for legislative term limits, and about
87. Cf. Robert H. Burt, The Constitution In Conflict (Belknap Press of Harvard U.
Press, 1992). Dare I suggest that the "difficulty" with the courts as constitutional policymakers in a democracy might better be dubbed "counterconversational" than
"countermajoritarian"?
88. See Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (1990) ("A candidate for judicial office shall not make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court." (emphasis supplied)).
89. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
90. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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the substantial advantages that incumbents appear to have in
electoral contests. Each in its own way may threaten the meaningfulness of the democratic conversation, by dampening the incumbent's incentive (and, in the case of the incumbent advantage, that of challengers as well) to engage the electorate in that
medium. Another problem -one to which the Supreme Court
has been attentive-is that of obstacles placed in the way of
ballot access for candidates. 91 There are surely legitimate interests that are served by requiring some significant showing of political support for a candidate seeking a place on the ballot. But
access that is too onerous is troublesome. If candidates who do
have some significant following are excluded from the ballot,
their followers may come to doubt that their concerns are taken
seriously in the democratic conversation.
The conversational model also brings into focus some of
what is at stake in current debates (and litigation92 ) about racially gerrymandered legislative districts. From a vote-centered
perspective, it might seem puzzling that members of racial minorities seem to attach great importance to having members of
their race as their representatives. As individual voters they
have essentially no influence on eventual legislative outcomes,
no matter who represents them. But even as groups, in votecentered terms members of racial minorities might be thought to
combine their voting resources more effectively by having them
spread out over several districts, rather than concentratin~ them
in a few in a way that ensures election of one of their own. 3 The
emphasis of the conversational perspective, on the other hand, is
on conversational involvement rather than on legislative outcomes. For members of the electorate able to experience it, the
ability to identify with a representative may well cause the
democratic conversation to be more personally meaningful.
This provides a quite general argument for districting along lines
of politically salient interests, but, given the history of race relations in the United States and the consequent destabilizing potential of minority disenchantment, racial minority groups may
be especially appro~riate candidates for such conversationenhancing districting. 4
91. See Stone et al., Constitutional Law at 786-91 (cited in note 25).
92. See Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush~-. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
93. See Charles Cameron, et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 794 (1996).
94. See Section XI. Needless to say, conversation enhancement through districting
cannot be made broadly available, since the number of racial, religious, ethnic, occupa-
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Democracy as meaningful conversation can also help frame
useful questions about campaign finance reform. Does commercial dominance of the airwaves by one side in an electoral
campaign seriously jeopardize the meaningfulness of the democratic conversation for those out of sympathy with the dominating message? Or does the secondary conversation leave the
overall effect robustly meaningful still? If campaign contribution limitations divert resources from primary to secondary
democratic conversation, does that affect the overall meaningfulness of the conversation? And then, quite apart from financing, does the drumbeat of short political advertisements
around election time produce more meaningful conversation or
more cynicism?
These could easily be multiplied, but it is important to emphasize that even if these questions are answered in conversational terms, public policy conclusions do not necessarily follow.
It is quite possible, for instance, that some phenomenon relevant
to the meaningfulness of the democratic conversation also
touches other significant aspects of the system. Some item of
campaign finance reform, for instance, might simultaneously increase the meaningfulness of the conversation but make it more
difficult to attract honest or intelligent people into public office.
In such a situation one might well conclude that the meaningfulness of the conversation was of secondary significance, either
because the quality of public servants is itself stability enhancing, or because that quality is independently important. In
similar fashion, the existing limit of two terms for the President
might be thought desirable despite the anti-conversational incentives provided in the second term, because excessive presidential power is more to be feared. But if the conversational
model does not answer all or even any of the many pressing
questions about American democracy, it certainly suggests different, and I hope fruitful, ways of framing a great many of
those questions.
tiona!, and other politically salient groupings far exceeds the three national legislators
representing most members of the electorate, or even the larger number of public officials for whom the typical American citizen is eligible to vote. Indeed the Constitution
forecloses such personal identification with members of the House of Representatives
for voters under the age of twenty-five, and for recent citizens, because it makes members of such groups ineligible to serve in the House. See also U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl.
2. For the Senate the ineligible population is defined along similar but more restrictive
lines. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 3, cl. 3. In addition to an even more restrictive age qualification, no person is eligible to be president who is not a "natural born citizen." U.S.
Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 5.

1997]

DEMOCRACY AS CONVERSATION

521

X

Democracy as meaningful conversation can also provide interesting insights on more general issues of democratic governance. It may, for instance, suggest that representative democracy is more "democratic" than direct democracy. As we have
seen, Madison thought that representative democracy was superior to direct democracy, because it would yield results "more
consonant to the public good. " 95 Others have defended representative democracy as the only efficient way to conduct democratic government-conceived in vote-centered terms-on a
large scale. 96 But if meaningful democratic involvement is
achieved more through conversation than through voting, we
may well have a greater measure of such meaningful involvement with the two-stage ongoing process of representative democracy than we ever might hope for with any but the most intimate examples of direct democracy.
Even if large direct democratic gatherings needn't degenerate into "mobs," 97 the individual's vote in any such gathering
would be very unlikely to affect any outcome, and the assembly
as a whole would have to do its business in a short time frame
and severely limit the items on its agenda, the number of speakers, the length of speeches, and likely all three at once. In a direct democracy of any size and degree of heterogeneity (to say
nothing of a hypothetical gathering of an entire nation state), it
would then be quite likely that no speaker would address any
matters in a way congenial to significant segments of the electorate. Most representative democracies, in contrast, limit the
size of legislative chambers so that each member has a real
They employ full-time
chance of affecting outcomes. 98
"professional" legislators meeting in extended sessions and
dealing with an extensive public agenda. This combination
vastly extends the potential for broad electoral involvement in
conversation that can play a meaningful, even if indirect, role in
the decisive legislative stage. 99

95. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at R2 (cited in note 5).
96. See remarks of "Philanthrop" and "Americanus Ill", in Debate cited in note 19.
97. See note 44.
98. The present 435 member House of Representatives may be testing the upper
limits of the size of a legislative chamber where each member has a fa1r chance of having
his vote affect ultimate dec1sions.
99. Cf. Amar, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment at 111 (cited in
note 24).
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Direct democracy might, of course, stimulate an extensive
secondary conversation that could serve as a vehicle for conversational engagement of the citizenry. And one could imagine
that direct democracies might come to accommodate a larger
agenda and more extended debate by scheduling frequent
meetings and choosing those who speak because of their representativeness of some electoral point of view. Any movement in
this direction would, of course, be limited by the fact that the
citizenry at large has other things to do. Putting that constraint
to the side, such moves might cause some give and take to develop between the representatives and their constituents. This
might further stimulate a secondary conversation, and the net
result could be a robust sense of engagement for members of the
electorate. Direct democracy would then have become democratic in the spirit of the conversational model, but it would have
done so by introducing elements of representative democracy
that make it congenial to democratic conversation.
The conversational model may also help resolve the democratic puzzle referred to in the public choice literature as the
"paradox of voting." 100 The paradox is rooted in the "free rider
problem" produced by the ineffectiveness of any individual's
vote to determine the outcome of an election. Given this ineffectiveness, each voter, if he is assessing things "rationally,"
should conclude that he might as well stay home (or do something more worthwhile) on election day and leave the voting to
("ride free" on the voting of) others. The paradoxical fact that
people do vote in large numbers has led to contorted attempts to
understand voting as having "consumption value" or
"entertainment value" for the voter. 101 In this way of thinking
about things, a voter votes not to affect the outcome of the election, but because he derives pleasure or satisfaction from performing his "civic duty" in participating in the selection of public officials.
Democracy as meaningful conversation helps to dissolve
the paradox. If voting is not the quintessential act of selfgovernment, but rather a pivotal stimulus for, and a part of, an
ongoing conversation-indeed one where the sense of personal
meaningfulness is heightened by a connection between representative and constituent-then it is more natural to think of in100. See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II ["Mueller If') 348-69
(Cambridge U. Press, 1989).
101. Id.; Mueller, Public Choice at 122 (cited in note 15).
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dividuals as valuing voting as part of what gives meaning to a
sustained activity that is a component of their everyday lives, of
their senses of self. To be sure, the average individual's participation in democratic conversation will not likely be decisive in
policy making. The chance of being conversationally influential
on some discrete issue is perhaps greater for many individuals
than the chance of determining the outcome of a candidate election, since there are lots of such issues. But the personal meaningfulness of the democratic conversation does not depend on
discernible influence on ultimate decisions. And even beyond
personal meaningfulness in the sense that I have been using the
term, we do not actively engage in ordinary conversations-even
those with an element of dispute-solely because we hope to
persuade. And we do not passively observe discussions by others solely because they will educate us better so that we can then
take some concrete action on firmer ground. Rather both active
and passive involvement in conversation give meaning to relationships to other individuals and more generally to the environment in which we function. There seems every reason to
think that the democratic conversation functions in much the
same way. This is, I suppose, a "consumption value" account of
why people vote (and could appropriately be called a response
to "civic duty"), but it is an account that gains plausibility because it frees the act of voting from the ineffectual isolation into
which it is cast by the vote-centered model.
Democracy as meaningful conversation also can help us appreciate why representative democracy seems to thrive on a
large scale, such as that found in the United States and other
populous democracies. At the time that the United States Constitution was adopted, the Antifederalists argued that a legislature made up of a tiny proportion of the population, such as that
which made sense for an extended republic, could not sensitively
represent the interests of a large population. 102 From a votecentered perspective they certainly had a point, for voting, even
when supplemented by open communication thereafter, cannot
make the legislature into a mechanism for processing the sentiments of a large population. Indeed if the vote is taken as the
mechanism of self-government, then, other things being equal,
the degree of the individual's self-governing power necessarily
102. In Volume I of The Debate on the Constitution, supra note 19, see, e.g., Centinel
/,at 60; Letters from the "Federal Farmer" to "The Republican," at 269; "Brutus" Ill, at
320,321, 323; Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph, at 467; Dissent of the
Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, at 533.
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diminishes as the size of the electorate grows, 103 approaching the
vanishing point with an electorate of any substantial size. The
democratic conversation, in contrast, has attributes of a "public
good" in the economist's sense, where participation by one person does not correspondingly diminish the capacity of others to
participate-as long as it is appreciated that by far the largest
portion of participation will be passive rather than active. 104 To
the extent that the democratic conversation is the linchpin of the
system, and participation in it by the electorate is largely passive, there is no obvious maximum size for districts in a stable
democracy, nor for the democracy as a whole. 10;
XI

Our Madisonian constitutional system was designed in significant part to deal with the politics of interests that we encountered in Section IV. Madison urged an extended republic encompassing all the states, for instance, as a corrective to what he
called "factions," which he defined as "citizens ... united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and ag-

103. Operating from a vote-centered perspective, Robert Dahl seems to acknowledge the point. Dahl, Critics (cited in note 20). He associates democracy with "one of
the most fundamental of all freedoms, the freedom to participate in the making of the
laws that will be binding on oneself and one's community." !d. at 78. But then, recognizing that the degree of "participation" understood in vote-centered terms must diminish as the size of the electorate increases, he suggests that "the greater scale [found in
representative democracies 1probably stimulates a concern for rights as alternatives to
participation in collective decisions." Jd. at 220.
104. This point is basically missed in Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering at 56 (cited in note 40). In discussing an alleged virtue of single member geographically based plurality systems as creating "a direct linkage between the elector and its
elected representative," Sartori asks whether the linkage can be "meaningful" in populous districts, and says that those who vote for the loser "simply lose their vote ... [are 1
not represented at all." !d. Once the possibility of passive but real participation in conversation is recognized, however, it is not clear that there need be a loss of "linkage" in
large districts. Indeed since the largest part of the democratic conversation proceeds
without the representative, deals with a multitude of different subjects, and contemplates eventual rather than immediate effect on the representative, see Section VII, it is
not even clear that active participation by one member of the electorate does that much
to crowd out acti~·e participation by others.
105. This point should be qualified by the recognition that smaller districts may
yield more engaging conversations, if the smaller size brings homogeneity along racial or
other conversationally salient dimensions, which then allows more personally meaningful involvement. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text. In that sense the Antifederalist point retains some force. But large districts can be homogenous and small districts
need not be. Without that homogeneity, the conversational advantages to smaller districts seem likely to be modest.
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gregate interests of the community." 106 "Extend the sphere [of
the country]," Madison urged in Federalist 10, and:
[y]ou take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if
such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison
107
with each other.

Despite the Madisonian correctives, concern with a politics
of interests has hardly abated. While Madison made no specific
mention of the coalescence of factions into organized groups,
the modern concern is more likely to be expressed in such terms.
There is perhaps no more common lament from all sides of the
political spectrum in the contemporary United States than that
of the untoward operation of "interest groups," which are often
referred to derisively as "special interests." There is even widespread doubt that there is such a thing as the "permanent and
aggregate interests of the community" or the "true interest
of ... [the] country" 108 as opposed to some "equilibrium" in the
bargaining process among organized groups. Indeed it is fair to
say that an interest group "model" of democratic politics has
gained substantial currency, in which democratic outcomes are
seen as the result of bargaining among organized groups. In the
most extreme versions of the model, it is such groups alone that
play significant roles in the production of legislation or other
important public policy choices. Legislators and other public officials are taken to act only as brokers among those groups, and
unorganized members of the electorate are basically irrelevant
in the production of democratic outcomes. 1()')
As a way to characterize actual democratic outcomes, the
interest group model probably has more plausibility than does
the vote-centered model, with its insistent and unrealistic egalitarianism. Still, as might be expected with any simple model, the
available empirical work suggests that there is a much richer set
of inputs into democratic outcomes than those of organized in110
Nor is this surprising from a theoretical perterest groups.
106. Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at 78 (cited in note 5).
107. Id. at 83.
108. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
109. See Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics 35 (Cornell U. Press, 1952);
Landes and Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& Econ. 875,877 (1975).
110. See Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 29-33 (cited in note 56).
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spective. Even apart from the insulation from constituent pressure that was Madison's aim, the interest of candidates and officials in election and reelection makes unlikely any exclusive
concern on their part with constituents who have coalesced into
organizations. There is no reason to think that issues that matter to voters either lead them to support organizations devoted
to those issues or not to care much at all. In between those extremes is the likelihood that some sentiments of large numbers
of voters will matter enough to affect voting behavior, though
not enough to justify support of groups organized around those
sentiments. To the extent that elected officials understand this,
they will seek to attract that class of unorganized voters. Candidates will remain disproportionately attentive to organized
groups, both as sources of information and as efficient mobilizers of votes, but that does not suggest anything like ignoring the
rest of us.
Interest group theorists have not focused on issues of stability. An interest group model might suggest instability, for the
outcomes it posits leave entirely unsatisfied those voters in between the extremes of organization and disinterest, those who
seriously care about certain issues but not enough to support
groups organized around those issues. But by hypothesis that
middle group of voters is disorganized and hence is likely to be
insufficiently powerful or insufficiently concerned to act on its
dissatisfaction in destabilizing ways. The recurrent grousing that
one hears about "special interests" might then under the interest
group model represent a resultant low level of dissatisfaction.
The concern with interest groups is readily understandable
in normative vote-centered terms. Any disproportionate influence of organized groups necessarily compromises the votecentered equality of inputs. In these terms, however, ordinary
politics is deficient as well.lJl Disproportionate interest in issues
is pervasive and makes everyman's politics a politics of interest.
There may well be problems in the outcomes of a politics of interests- "rent seeking" legislation and the like, the societal costs
of which exceed the benefits-and organized groups may produce more of such outcomes than ordinary voters. But the root
of the problem is in differential interests, not in the fact that

111. As Madison's Federalist 10 discussion, see notes 107-108 and accompanying
text, seems implicitly to recognize, with its concern with common interests or passions,
but with no mention of any special role of organizations in pursuing those interests or
passions politically. See Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers (cited in note 5).
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those interests find expression through organized groups. This
makes any vote-centered descriptive account of the dissatisfaction with interest groups in politics ring somewhat hollow, since
there is little hint of such dissatisfaction with the politics of the
unorganized.
The conversational model provides a far more satisfactory
explanation of the pattern of dissatisfaction. It is public decisionmaking outside the conversational ambit that in conversational terms has the potential to be problematic. The clearest
case of such decisionmaking that proceeds heedless of the
democratic conversation is the proverbial "back-room deal," an
understanding reached between interest groups and decisionmakers outside the public eye. What is problematic about interest groups from the perspective of democracy as meaningful
conversation is thus not some disproportion of influence on certain outcomes, but rather that organized groups have the capacity denied to most of us to engage in such back-room dealsleaving meaningless any public conversation about the subject
matter of those deals. Even when the secret favors the interest
groups receive take otherwise legitimate form, deal making outside the ambit of the democratic conversation thus drains democracy of what the conversational theory posits as the taproot
of public support. Groups are, of course, no different in this respect from individuals with the interest and the resources for
private lobbying, but they are quite different from the interested
but unorganized voter, for whom public conversation (including
the vote) is the exclusive means of democratic participation.
Conversely, within the conversational model, interest
groups are essentially unproblematic when they engage in the
democratic conversation. Indeed they may serve a salutary purpose if they facilitate the public expression of the views of some
voters. The disproportionate attention to what organized
groups have to say may cause some concern when there are both
organized and unorganized groupings of voters who care passionately about an issue. Still, within the conversational model
this has no seriously dispiriting effect if the democratic conversation nonetheless remains meaningful for the unorganized, if,
that is, the unorganized view is given voice and the conversational stance of the interest groups and the public official is not
taken to be a sham that masks a decisional process that is really
proceeding in private and heedless of what is being said publicly.
The possibility of a sham is, however, impossible to dispel,
for organized groups have the capacity for back-room dealing,
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even if in fact they operate completely in the open. Both groups
and officials can lessen such concern by engaging in the democratic conversation. But the mere capacity of organized groups
to operate outside the ambit of the conversation, combined with
the difficulty of tracing the causation of democratic outcomes,
probably condemns American democracy to chronic concern
about the political operation of interest groups.
There is a converse problem to the disproportionately large
political influence of organized interest groups. This is the
problem known to American constitutional law as that of
"discrete and insular minorities." The idea is that some groups
of voters (whether organized or not) are disdained by others and
hence shut out of the political give and take. The phrase
"discrete and insular" is not a particularly good choice, because
widely dispersed groups may be even more politically ineffectual
than insular ones. 112 In any event, in conversational terms the
problem is the existence of voters for whom the democratic conversation has no personal meaningfulness, because it is clear to
them that their conversational participation is not politically
meaningful.
It is probably inevitable that there will be categories of voters that are perennially excluded from the democratic conversation, and within bounds this is unavoidable and unproblematic.
Any society will treat certain behavior and certain aspirations as
beyond respectable bounds. This is true in the United States,
for instance, of polygamists, of those who would employ minor
children in hard labor, and, to cite a couple of recently prominent examples, of Texas secessionists, and of those who practice
female circumcision- to say nothing of the society's thieves and
murderers. Even in such cases, arguments that the behavior
should not be disdained will occasionally be heard and even
heeded. There are few more reviled persons in the United States
today than "drug dealers," but there is also a lively debate about
whether and to what extent the sale of certain prohibited drugs
should be legalized. In addition, members of such excluded
groups may find conversational engagement on other matters.
An advocate of polygamy may also be intensely interested in
whether the city council subsidizes a new football stadium or
logging is allowed in national forests. But even if some disfavored persons find little in the way of conversational alterna112. See Robert W. Bennett, Abortion and Judicial Review: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 15 Nw. U. L. Rev. 978,996 (1981).
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tives, social living dictates that certain matters remain more or
less indefinitely outside legitimate conversational bounds.
The more serious conversational problem- the one that
takes on constitutional dimensions-arises when there are no
plausibly acceptable grounds for conversational exclusion. Thus
Black Americans were long notoriously excluded by both formal
and informal means from most avenues of political participation
in large parts of the country. Because of this history they are
usually cited as the quintessential "discrete and insular minority."
The problem of malapportioned state legislatures can be
conceived in terms of the exclusion of some from the conversational give and take. Neither Madison nor the Constitution he
did so much to craft addressed the interest group problem at the
state (and local) level, where, as Madison put it, "the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests ... the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression." 113
The "oppression" he had in mind, of course, was political disdain and exclusion of those who were opposed to the majority,
and resultant disregard of their interests. It was Madison's central argument for the new Constitution that in a large and heterogeneous country such factional oppression would be difficult.
But on a state level he saw it as a problem of serious dimensions.
If this Madisonian analysis of the state situation is accepted, it is
also reasonable to conclude that the interest group problem at
the state level was substantially exacerbated by malapportionment of state legislatures prior to Reynolds. 114
Prior to Reynolds, apportionment was strictly up to the
state legislatures themselves, with the result that any dominant
factions had substantial leeway to perpetuate that dominance.
State legislatures were thus importantly different from and more
troublesome than the Senate in both presenting more of a
problem of interest group sway in the first place and in tending
to entrench it. The result of such entrenchment, of course,
would be effectively to exclude (or at least substantially disfavor) others in the political give and take. By leaving the only effective mechanism for stirring the political pot under the control
of those who had an interest in keeping its contents still, the
113.

Federalist 10 (Madison), The Federalist Papers at 83 (cited in note 5). Justice

~Calia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, 116 Sup. Ct. 1620, 1634 {1996), graphically depicts in

mterest group terms struggles at the state and local level in Colorado.
114. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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malapportionment of state legislatures may thus have bred cynicism about the meaningfulness of the democratic conversation
not just for conventional discrete and insular minorities like
Black Americans, but for even more substantial portions of the
electorate in affected states.
In this sense, requiring periodic reapportionment of state
legislatures might have been a mechanism by which to unsettle
factional tyrannies in the state context, and thereby to shore up
the democratic conversation at that level. On these assumptions
Reynolds may be seen as a mechanism for strengthening American democracy, albeit in a very different way than the Court
claimed, or perhaps even realized. And if this is accepted, there
is not much of a puzzle about the popular embrace of Reynolds,
and its comfortable coexistence with a malapportioned Senate.
For Reynolds may have required state legislatures to become
more like the United States Senate in the conversationenhancing way that the conversational model takes as important
to a stable democracy.
XII
There are plainly some phenomena of American democracy
for which the vote-centered model provides a better account
than does democracy as meaningful conversation. For one
thing, consider the repeated depiction of the system as
"majoritarian" and the fixation with what popular majorities
think. I have treated these as aberrations and discounted them,
but they are also phenomena which a model might seek to explain.
Potentially there is a good deal more than the rhetoric of
American democracy at stake. Consider a hypothetical tale.
Under the convoluted procedure that the United States Constitution establishes for selection of the President, if no person
commands a majority in the electoral college, the House of Representatives chooses among the three candidates with the largest
number of electoral college votes. In that House election each
state delegation has one vote. With the Perot candidacy in 1992
there seemed for a time to be the possibility that no candidate
would command a majority of the electoral college. Now suppose that there had been an electoral college standoff, and that
in the House the less populous states had joined together to
produce a choice for President of the candidate who had come
in (a distant) third in the popular vote.
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Such a turn of events is not particularly far-fetched.
I
have little doubt that if it had transpired it would have presented
the country with an important crisis, and possibly a seriously
destabilizing one. If I am right in this speculation, it must be because selection of a President traceable to a relatively small
popular minority runs against some part of the grain of American democracy. It is irrelevant to that part of the grain that the
hypothesized turn of events would have been accompanied by
the most searching and serious public conversation-as it almost
surely would. Only history can account for how we got the constitutional procedure for selection of the President, and only
considerations
outside
the
conversational
modelconsiderations such as the stabilizing force of egalitarianism and
majoritarianism in the system-can account for the trouble into
which that history just might have led us in 1992, and might lead
us yet. 116 In this sense the electoral college route to selection of
a President, which I have mentioned as evidence that our democracy is not so insistently majoritarian, also suggests that the
system likely has important majoritarian strains.
But if democracy as meaningful conversation paints only an
incomplete picture of a complex system, it colors in a good deal
more than its chief competition. Among the features of American democracy that the conversational model accounts for decidedly better than the vote-centered model are bicameralism
and satisfaction with the Senate; election of a President independent of the legislative branch; the electoral treatment of
children and their parents; the constitutional role of the Supreme Court, and its popular embrace; the comfortable use of
single (or dual) member geographically defined legislative districting; the plurality selection norm in legislative elections; the
pervasive suspicion of the political activity of interest groups;
and the appeal to minority group voters of districting likely to
send members of their groups to serve in legislatures.

115. After imagining the above I came across a variation on the drama in Lawrence
D. Longley and Neil R. Peirce, The Electoral College Primer 1-15 (Yale U. Press, 1996)
(chap. 1, titled "The 1996 Election is not Quite Decided: A Fantasy"). Chapter 3, entitled "Recent Crisis Elections" documents the regularity with which we court trouble because of the electoral college scheme. !d. at 37-88. The authors quote former Senator
Kefauver as saying, "Every four years the electoral college is a loaded pistol aimed at
our system of government. Its continued existence is a game of Russian roulette. Once
its antiquated procedures trigger a loaded cylinder, it may be too late for the needed
corrections." !d. at 124.
116. My own hunch is that the House would likely avoid such a move against the
grain, but even if I am right that only serves to emphasize that the grain is there.
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I do not, however, want to exaggerate the power of the conversational model. There is plenty of disengagement and cynicism about government in the United States-with attendant
implications for stability-despite the ubiquity of the democratic
conversation. And there are undoubtedly explanations for the
stability of American democracy that have little to do with conversation-or with vote-centeredness. The prosperity of the
country would be high up on my list if I were asking what it is
about American society rather than about American democracy
that causes stability. (And the maldistribution of that prosperity
would be high on my list of causes for concern about instability.)
I am sensitive about the possibility that the conversational
model may be uncritically rooted in American democracy. I
have intentionally left a degree of ambiguity about whether the
power of the model extends beyond the United States. On the
one hand, I have identified certain features of American democracy that seem especially suited to conversational engagement. In this connection, it is at least suggestive that democracy
in the United States is the longest lived in the world despite the
fact that it has ethnic, racial, and religious "cleavages" that, not
surprisingly in the United States and elsewhere, have been associated with instability. 117 On the other hand, wide ranging public
conversation about public policy is found in democracies beyond
our borders, and may well have stabilizing effects in those contexts as well. It may just be that the United States is a basically
conversational democracy (with elements of vote-centeredness),
while some other democracies are basically vote-centered (with
elements of conversationalism). 118 In this sense it might be appropriate to think of democracy as meaningful conversation not
so much as a model of democracy, but as an interpretation of the
version found in the United States.
All this suggests an agenda for comparative research. The
constituent states in the United States vary in a number of ways
that might be relevant to the nature and quality of the democratic conversation, like sizes (and, thanks to Nebraska, the

117. See Robert A. Dahl, Thinking About Democratic Constitutions: Conclusions
from Democratic Experience, in Nomos XXXVIII at 175, 189 (cited in note 52).
118. It is common currency among political scientists that political parties in the
United States are "less disciplined ... than European-style parties." Norman Schofield,
Rational Choice and Political Economy, in Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice
Controversy 189, 202 (Yale U. Press, 1996). The discipline referred to is faithfulness to
party programs, and there should be some substantial tradeoff between party discipline
and openness to meaningful public conversation.
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number) of their legislative chambers, ratio of legislators to voters, use of term limits for legislators, regulation of campaign finances, the nature and extent of popular balloting on issues, and
the number of public officials who must stand for election. Because the states are embedded in the United States there is no
varying degree of stability with which these features might readily be correlated. But it still might be possible to compare the
different states along some measure of a popular sense of involvement in the process of governing.
Foreign democracies, of course, differ from those in the
United States in quite fundamental ways. Those democracies
characterized by proportional representation might be treated
as vote-centered, with the United States as a conversational democracy. The two might then be compared for the nature and
extent of a sense of popular involvement in governance and of
119
stability.
While there could be some payoff in such comparative research, the results are unlikely ever to instill the kind of confidence that attends modeling in the natural sciences. There is
simply no substitute for the controlled experimentation available in hard sciences. Nor will it necessarily do to wait. Models
of democracy that we carry around in our heads affect actions
that we take here and now. They affect, for instance, contemporary debates in the United States about term limits, incumbency
advantages, campaign finance, initiatives and referenda, the role
of the courts in constitutional review, ballot access, ballot desig120
nation of candidates with multiple parties, and lots of other issues. As I have been at pains to say, I do not advance democracy as meaningful conversation as resolving any such debates,
but I do think it can clarify them, and that is a contribution not
to be gainsaid, or even to await completion of an ambitious
agenda of comparative empirical research.

119. Compare G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation,
Stability, and Violence (Harvard U. Press, 19S2); Dahl, Thinking About Democratic
Constitutions at 191 and n.32 (cited in note 52).
120. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (I 997).

